"The intellectual," Vaclav Havel has written, "should constantly disturb, should bear witness to the misery of the world, should be provocative by being independent, should rebel against all hidden and open pressure and manipulations, should be the chief doubter of systems, of power and its incantations, should be a witness to their mendacity."[1] In this wonderfully eloquent passage, composed in 1986 when the Czechoslovakia's Communist regime still had the capacity to make life hellish for those who dared to oppose it, Havel provides a particularly vivid expression of the perspective that has dominated most thinking and writing about intellectuals: that they are "disturbers of the peace" whose ultimate responsibility is to tell the truth, even (and perhaps especially) if it arouses the ire of the established authorities. In so arguing, Havel joins a long tradition of discourse about intellectuals beginning with Zola and extending though Benda and Orwell to Kolakowski and many others which insists that the proper function of intellect is, in the memorable words of Ignazio Silone, "the humble and courageous service of truth."[2] That this viewpoint, which we shall call here the "moralist" tradition, retains vitality today is illustrated by no less a figure then Edward Said, who in delivering the prestigious Reith Lectures for the BBC in 1993, repeatedly emphasized that the tasks of the contemporary intellectual is "to speak the truth to power."[3]

For the social theorist who wishes to understand the place of intellectuals in politics, the fundamental problem with the moralist tradition exemplified by Havel is that it treats intellectuals not as they actually are, but as they should be. The moralist tradition provides, in short, an idealized normative form of reference for thinking about intellectuals rather than an empirically grounded analytical one.

Against the grand moralist tradition of discourse about intellectuals, the present article proposes an alternative "realist" tradition rooted in classical and contemporary sociology. While this tradition by no means abandons the question of what intellectuals ought to do, its primary focus -- exemplified in the diverse work of Michels, Mannheim, Mills, Lipset, Gouldner, Brym,

Szelenyi, Bourdieu, and Bauman[4] -- is on identifying the conditions and processes that shape the actual political consciousness and actions of different groups of intellectuals.

The starting point for the realist sociology of intellectuals is a forthright acknowledgment that the goals professed (and, in most cases sincerely held) by intellectuals may diverge from their concrete social practices. Perhaps no better example of such a divergence may be found than the one analyzed in Robert Michels' Political Parties, a classic 1911 study of Germany's Social Democratic Party which revealed that the party of the German proletariat was in fact dominated by a small group of leaders, many of them intellectuals, whose interests had become divorced from those of the rank-and-file. Though in principle representing the interests of the German working class, the SPD, like "every organ of the collectivity," had created "interests peculiar to itself" -- interests involving "a necessary conflict with the interests of the collectivity."[5] The most fundamental of these conflicts was that between "the leaders and led" -- a conflict tilted heavily in favor of the latter, Michels believed, given their "more extensive knowledge" and their "better-instructed minds."[6] Should the socialists ever succeed in taking power, he warned, "Nothing could be more anti-scientific than the supposition...that the interests of these leaders will coincide perfectly with the interests of the led."[7]

The sensibility infusing Michels' realist sociology of intellectuals is deeply skeptical of claims that intellectuals have an inherent tendency to oppose established authorities or that their intrinsically critical nature impels them to "speak the truth to power." In his essay on "Intellectuals" in the 1937 edition of the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Michels declared flatly that:

> The theory that the intelligentsia has an immanently revolutionary character is then not in accord with the facts. Differing among themselves in origin, character, training and theory, intellectuals are the officers and subaltern of all arms and of all armies. In the polities of any period the parties of revolution, of continuity and of reaction have all been in their hands...[8]

A key question, then, is why some intellectuals align themselves with the forces of "revolution" while others take the side of "continuity" and of "reaction."[9] The answer, Michels and other realists believe, resides less in any ethical mission or responsibility that intellectuals may claim to have than in the social positions they occupy and the interests that they strive to defend. This insight provides the starting point for a theory of intellectuals and politics.

Intellectuals in the Social Structure

"Any attempt to define intellectuals," Zygmunt Bauman has observed, "is an attempt at self-definition."[10] All such definitions, he notes, are at bottom based on the binary opposition between "intellectuals" and "non-intellectuals," with a socially constructed boundary separating the two categories.[11] Indeed, in Eastern Europe, the very constitution of the "intelligentsia," he argues, was grounded in a fundamental opposition in which the "people" -- the unenlightened masses -- "were construed as the Other of the intelligentsia."[12]

After Foucault, it is impossible to neglect the power dimensions involved in the very act of defining the term "intellectual," for different definitions will support or undermine the discursive claims of competing groups.[13] Yet any attempt at constructing a theory of intellectuals and politics will perforce require some specification of whom we are talking about when we refer to intellectuals. For analytical purposes, it is essential that the definition employed scrupulously avoid pre-judging the ideological proclivities of intellectuals, for it is precisely their ideological orientations we wish to explain. Thus definitions such as the one offered recently by Edward Said -- a definition which includes the claim that the role of the intellectual "cannot be played without a sense of being someone whose place it is publicly to raise embarrassing questions, to confront orthodoxy and dogmas"[14] -- begs the very question we are trying to answer. Nor are definitions stressing personal qualities -- such as Richard Hofstadter's description of the intellectual as someone who "has a sense of dedication to the life of the mind which is very much

like a religious commitment"[15] -- very helpful in construction a framework for understanding the relationship between "the intellectuals and the powers."[16]

A sociologically rigorous definition of the intellectual will depend, then, neither on specific ideological commitments or personal qualities, but rather on a distinctive location within the larger social structure. From this perspective, the definition offered by Lipset -- that intellectuals are "all those who create, distribute, and apply culture, that is, the symbolic world of man, including art, science, and religion"[17] -- is close to the mark. Within this schema, those who create or produce culture may be considered at the core of the intelligentsia, with "generalizing intellectuals" concerned with fundamental cultural values and the interpretation of experience as its "hard core."[18] Examples of the creators of culture would be scholars, authors, artists, and some editors and journalists. One step removed from those who create culture would be those individuals who transmit or distribute it; characteristic members of this segment would be most teachers, clerics, and journalists. Finally, at the edge of the intelligentsia would be those who apply culture as part of their jobs; most engineers, physicians, and lawyers would fall into this category.[19]

Within this framework, intellectuals may be conceived schematically as a social group with a core and a periphery; alternatively they may be viewed as stratified into those who produce, those who transmit, and those who apply culture. But another representation of intellectuals, influenced by the fluid imagery of postmodernism, may also be useful; from this angle, intellectuals are those who occupy a "spot" or a "territory" within a structure of a larger society: "a territory inhabited by a shifting population and open to invasions, conquests and legal claims as all ordinary territories are."[20] From this viewpoint, the anthropologist Katherine Verdery suggests, intellectuals may be seen as the "occupants of a site that is privileged in forming and transmitting discourses." To be an "intellectual," then, "means to make

knowledge/value claims, to gain some degree of social recognition for them, and to participate in social relations on the basis of this exchange of claims and recognition."[21]

The sphere in which intellectuals may most plausibly make authority claims is the cultural sphere -- the symbolic realm of knowledge, values, and meaning in which intellectuals may make claims to "legitimate domination."[22] Yet despite their privileged position in the cultural sphere, their location in the social structure does not give them a similarly privileged basis for making such claims in the economic and political spheres. And it is precisely the economic and political spheres that have, at least since the nineteenth century, been the major sources of "social power" in the principle countries of the Western world.[23]

Intellectuals thus occupy a peculiar position in modern societies; they govern an important (and relatively autonomous) sphere of social life, but this sphere is itself ultimately a subordinate one. Putting the matter another way, intellectuals are the dominant holders of cultural capital, but they are "dominated in relation to the holders of political and economic capital."[24] As the possessors of large volumes of cultural capital, they are, to be sure, the beneficiaries of important privileges; they are, moreover, in a vastly superior position to the large segment of the population that benefits from neither of the main forms of social closure in capitalist societies: private property and educational credentials.[25] Far more tied socially and culturally to dominant rather than subordinate social groups, intellectuals in the aggregate nevertheless lack the economic and/or political capital that would make them core members of the dominant class. Perhaps no formulation has better captured the dual character of their social position -- at once privileged and subordinate -- than Bourdieu's description of intellectuals as "a dominated fraction of the dominant class."[26]

Presiding over the cultural domain, intellectuals have certain affinities of interest and outlook with other elites that preside over other key institutional domains. Though each domain or "field"[27] has its own logic, those who occupy dominant positions within their respective

spheres share an obvious interest in the status quo. It is thus misleading to assume, as does much of the existing literature, that intellectuals will typically adopt an oppositional stance towards the existing order; most of them have, after all, attained a relatively privileged position within it, and their well-being often depends upon the acquisition of resources controlled by political and economic elites with whom they are socially and culturally linked. From this vantage point, what needs to be explained is less why intellectuals reach accommodations with the status quo than what it is that causes some of them, at certain historical moments, to rebel.

Yet if there are powerful forces pushing intellectuals to cooperate with established authorities, there are often factors that make their relationship with the powers-that-be a complex and ambivalent one. Bauman captures this ambivalence well when he observes that among intellectuals "suspicion and dissent constantly alternate with a powerful attraction -- nay, fascination -- with the power of the state." Attraction and repulsion, Bauman notes, may "succeed each other with a breath-taking speed." But more often "they cohabit uneasily within the same intellectual community; often inside the same 'split personality' of a single intellectual."[28]

The roots of the ambivalence of intellectuals towards those who hold political and economic power reside in their distinctive location in the social structure. On the one hand, they are far closer socially to political and economic elites than they are to members of subordinate social groups such as workers or peasants; on the other, the privileges they possess generally pale in comparison to the privileges held by those at the very top of the political and economic fields. As the group that exercises cultural dominance, intellectuals often feel a moral and cognitive superiority to those who control the levers of political and economic power. But this sense of superiority, often commingled with feelings of ressentiment, does not alter the brute fact of their subordinate position within the elite.

Whatever the underlying antagonisms, the relations among economic, political, and cultural elites are under ordinary circumstances cooperative. Possessing interests in common against what Weber rather euphemistically called “negatively privileged groups”[29] (those lacking any of the principle valued forms of capital), intellectuals often share with those who preside over the polity and the economy a predisposition to reinforce rather than undermine existing structures of authority. From the perspective of those who wield political and economic power, intellectuals possess crucial specialized knowledge as well as the important ideological capacity to legitimate (or, in some cases, delegitimate) the prevailing order. And from the viewpoint of intellectuals, political and economic elites for their part control resources without which it would be difficult, if not impossible, for them to carry out their role as producers of culture.

The modus vivendi that intellectuals and the established authorities often reach with each other thus reflects their common elite status and their mutual dependence. Nevertheless, there have been recurrent instances -- ranging from the French Revolution and the failed Revolution of 1848 through the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the very different Revolution of 1989 -- when intellectuals have actively struggled against the existing order.[30] This apparent paradox is better understood if we conceive of intellectuals as a potentially competing elite, rooted in the cultural sphere, which under certain historical conditions has both the inclination and the capacity to mount a challenge to the elites which preside over the political and economic domains.[31] When this occurs, intellectuals attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the status quo and promulgate ideologies -- usually in the name of the “people” or the “nation” -- that justify their own claims to power.

Towards a Theory of Intellectual Radicalism

Can the circumstances under which intellectuals are most likely to adopt a revolutionary, or at least an oppositional, stance towards the status quo be identified? Though no “iron laws”

may be offered, a theory of intellectuals and politics must nevertheless attempt to discover whether certain conditions are more conducive to intellectual radicalism than others. A broad reading of modern history since 1789 would seem to suggest that there are specific circumstances that lend themselves to political opposition rather than accommodation. And while no single one of these circumstances produces political dissent, together they offer a portrait of the conditions under which intellectuals are most likely to adopt a position of radical opposition to the existing order. Among the most important of such conditions are:

> (1) The presence of well-organized and politically radical subordinate social groups. Such groups are capable, in Gramsci's terms, of generating their own "organic intellectuals." Just as the bourgeoisie succeeded in elaborating intellectuals who "give it homogeneity and an awareness of its function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields."[32] From a rather different perspective, Mannheim reached a similar conclusion; "Stable and well-entrenched political parties," he observed, "create their own intelligentsia."[33] A concrete illustration of this process would be the cases of France and Italy, where strong Communist parties created institutionalized opportunities for intellectual involvement with revolutionary politics. Nations with less radical working classes such as Britain and Canada offered fewer occupational and political opportunities for radically inclined intellectuals and reinforced reformist rather than revolutionary tendencies among them.[34] With the decline of left-wing working-class parties and trade unions, the locus of intellectual radicalism has shifted in recent years to social movements such as feminism, black (and other subordinated racial and ethnic groups) liberation, and

environmentalism.[35] Each of these movements, in turn, is capable of generating its own organic intellectuals.

(2) The absence of a strong business class. Societies with a dynamic entrepreneurial middle class generate higher levels of market demand for intellectuals, leading to greater levels of political incorporation.[36] A concomitant of such market demand is frequently the rise of vigorous professions and professional ideologies. In societies where this occurs, the model of professionalism affords a vehicle for satisfying the collective ambitions of entire occupational categories that, as Larson has suggested, otherwise might be inspired by the labor movement. The ideology of professionalism is especially likely to flourish in societies with well-developed civil societies and market economies.[37] Classical examples of such societies are England and especially the United States; the archetypal example of a society lacking these conditions and hence possessing an intelligentsia that was only weakly professionalized was tsarist Russia, with the neighboring societies of Eastern Europe displaying broadly similar patterns.[38]

(3) A high ratio of "relatively unattached" intellectuals to those employed by large-scale organizations. By virtue of their lack of attachment to such organizations, such intellectuals are less likely to be integrated into the status quo; Mannheim, whose later work emphasizes the distinctive character of such "relatively unattached" (n.b. not "free floating") intellectuals, put the matter well when he observed that: "Large and well-entrenched organizations are usually able to assimilate and indoctrinate the newcomer and paralyze his will to dissent and innovate."[39] Especially

conducive to the growth of political radicalism are societies in which the higher levels of the educational system produce far more graduates than can be absorbed by the marketplace, as in Italy during much of the period since the late nineteenth century and Germany during the 1920s and early 1930s.[40] The "blocked mobility" that occurs in such situations, as well as under conditions of rigid elite social closure, provides fertile ground for radical antagonism to the existing social order; the "intellectual proletarians" who result from overproduction of graduates, Michels claimed, "furnish the yeast for social revolutions and champion the masses in the class struggle."[41] But under- or unemployed revolutionaries from the intelligentsia are by no means necessarily on the left; indeed, in the crucial case of Weimar Germany, many such marginalized young intellectuals turned to the Nazis as a vehicle for transforming a despised social order.

(4) The presence of a moderately repressive regime that lacks the means and/or the will to stamp out dissent. Repression and censorship typically antagonize important segments of the intelligentsia and fan the flames of discontent, especially when they are imposed in an inconsistent and/or limited fashion. Nevertheless, extreme repression, especially when tied to modern technologies of power and surveillance, is fully capable of crushing overt political opposition from the intelligentsia; the ferociously repressive regimes of Hitler and Stalin are cases in point. But when dictatorial regimes attempt to reform and "liberalize" themselves, they are particularly susceptible to outbursts of radical opposition from the intelligentsia, as in Hungary and Poland in 1956, and China in 1989.[42] If there is a pattern between regime repression and intellectual radicalism, it is

an curvilinear one, with challenges to the authorities most likely to be mounted by intellectuals when repression is at an intermediate rather than a high or a low level.[43]

(5) Weakness and/or divisions within the ruling group. Like other social groups, intellectuals sense when the ruling elite is politically vulnerable, and it is at such movements that they are most likely to contest the legitimacy its authority. Perhaps the most common cause of elite vulnerability to political challenges from the intelligentsia is divisions within the ruling group itself. In Communist Czechoslovakia, for example, the 1967 split behind "hardliners" and "reformers" (and the related split between the Slovaks and the Czechs) opened the way to the Prague Spring, a movement that was at bottom a revolt of the intelligentsia.[44] Among the democratic capitalist societies of the West, an important example of how splits within the ruling group can encourage the growth of intellectual radicalism would be the divisions that developed among both political and economic elites during the course of the Vietnam War. While it was opposition from relatively small segments of the intelligentsia that initially helped produce these splits, it was only when divisions within the elite became publicly visible (as they did when prominent politicians challenged President Johnson's conduct of the war) that a radical oppositional stance within the intelligentsia took on an increasingly mass character, especially in its student segment.[45]

(6) When the state is unable to protect the "people" or the "nation" from economic, political, or military encroachments from other states that occupy more powerful positions within the world system. Such external

challenges can undermine the authority of the prevailing ruling group. A declining position in the international economy, for example, can render political and economic elites ideologically vulnerable, especially when cosmopolitan intellectuals draw attention to the "backwardness" of their home country. But the external challenge most corrosive of the authority of the indigenous political elite occurs when the state that it presides over proves unequal to the military task of protecting their territory from the challenges of more powerful states. Such international pressures constitute one of the crucial elements in the constellation of factors that produced revolutions in both China and Russia.[46] Under conditions of military occupation or invasion, radical intellectuals can present themselves as defenders of the integrity of the "nation," as Ho Chi Minh did in his struggles against both France and the United States. When nationalist intellectuals -- whether of the left or the right -- are able to make plausible claims that they are carriers of the "national idea,"[47] it may then be possible for them to build powerful political alliances with subordinate social groups such as peasants and workers from whom they are normally separated by differences of interest and world view.

(7) <u>The presence of sharp boundaries between social groups, including the boundary separating intellectuals from non-intellectuals (i.e. the "people").</u> The classic examples of societies in which the intelligentsia was clearly demarcated from other social groups are Russia and Poland in the nineteenth century; in the former, they became propagators first of the ideology of populism and then of socialism,[48] whereas in stateless Poland, they became passionate advocates of various versions of nationalist

ideology.[49] But cases in which groups of intellectuals become well-defined "status groups" in the Weberian sense of the term -- associational communities bound together by cultural co-membership, common styles of life, and feelings of status equality[50] -- are by no means limited to Eastern Europe. France since the Dreyfus affair would probably be the best example of a Western nation in which intellectuals emerged as a social group with a strong sense of corporate identity[51] and a willingness to serve as "legislators" (i.e. the makers of authoritative claims) on matters of aesthetic judgment, truth, and moral value.[52] Even the United States, a society with relatively weak boundaries between social groups (or at least those groups that might be defined in terms of class) has at times generated networks of intellectuals with many of the attributes of a classical European intelligentsia; the best example of such a group would be the renowned "New York intellectuals," whose influence reached its zenith from the 1930s to the 1950s.[53] As a general proposition, it would seem that the sharper the boundaries (social, cultural, and geographic) between intellectuals and other social groups, the grater is their capacity for collective action. Certainly French and Polish intellectuals -- two groups which historically have had well-defined identities -- have been among the most politically active, with opposition to the powers-that-be a recurrent phenomenon.

(8) <u>The existence of historically-grounded cultural repertories of resistance to authority.</u> Whatever their claims to universalism, intellectuals are rooted in cultural settings with distinctive national traditions. Where these traditions include well-established cultural repertoires of identity and action against authorities socially defined as oppressive, intellectuals are

more likely to engage in radical acts of resistance. Poland in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries provides a particularly vivid example of such a cultural repertoire; for members of the Polish intelligentsia, many of them with origins in the gentry, socialization into their roles as "gentleman" made it a matter of elementary honor and self-respect to actively resist foreign occupiers.[54] And they did so repeatedly, first against the tsar, then against the young Soviet regime, later still against both Hitler and Stalin, and finally against the post-Stalin Soviet Union.[55] At times, national cultural repertoires of rebellion seem to provide something like a "script" which the "actors" may then play out, as when French students put up barricades in the Latin Quarter in May 1968.[56] Where no such script or repertoire is available, radically inclined intellectuals will have to create their own, or combine their own traditions of rebellion with those from elsewhere, as the student radicals in Tianenmen Square did with great resourcefulness in 1989.[57] In general, however, the absence or weakness of such a national cultural repertoire of resistance would seem to make overt opposition to the authorities less likely.

None of the conditions enumerated above, nor even all of them together, guarantee that intellectuals will adopt a radical, or even an oppositional, stance towards the established authorities. For the forces tying intellectuals to status quo are powerful indeed, and intellectuals, like other social groups, under most circumstances find accommodation to the existing order far more rewarding and even "natural" than active resistance. Nevertheless, there are conditions under which intellectual opposition to the powers-that-be is possible and perhaps even likely. To shed further light on what some of these conditions may be, we will turn to a setting that has

generated some of the twentieth century's conspicuous examples of intellectual opposition to the established order: that of the Communist regimes of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The Case of the East European Intelligentsia and Communist Regimes

Nowhere has the issue of the relationship between the intellectuals and the powers been raised with greater sharpness than in Russia and Eastern Europe. In part, this is because the "intelligentsia" as a distinct social group was born in this region -- to be precise, in Russia and Poland in the mid-nineteenth century.[58] Here the competing claims of power of the oppositional intelligentsia and the existing ruling elite were visible with unusual starkness. And here, as well, a group of revolutionary Marxist intellectuals -- a relatively compact, but passionately committed, sub-group of the oppositional intelligentsia -- was able, in the years after the October Revolution of 1917, to play a major role in constructing the world's first Communist regime. The classical "intelligentsia" of the region would be effectively destroyed in the process, but a new "socialist" or "people's" intelligentsia would rise in its place.[59] Yet this "people's intelligentsia" never fully abandoned the traditional intelligentsia's claims to a distinctive identity and sense of mission, and frequently clashed with the Communist authorities. When Communism in Eastern Europe finally crumbled in 1989, it was the "socialist intelligentsia" that was, in one of history's great ironies, at the forefront of the opposition.[60]

Before moving on to examine the peculiar character of relations between intellectuals and power under Communism, we will look briefly at the nature of the "classical" East European intelligentsia which had reached its purest expression in Russia and Poland. More than simply the category of highly educated individuals, the classical intelligentsia of Eastern Europe was a real social group with its own distinctive values, cultural style, networks of marriage and friendship, and sense of collective identity.[61] Priding itself on its "cultivation," it distinguished itself sharply from the prevailing political authorities -- in Russia, the tsarist autocracy, and in

Poland, the occupying rulers representing the Hapsburg, Prussian, and Russian empires. While a revolutionary stance towards the status quo was not a precondition for membership in the intelligentsia, an oppositional or at least a "critical" attitude was. A product of specific conditions prevailing in Eastern Europe -- among them, political autocracy, a weakly developed market economy, and the breakdown of an old "estate" society that left in its wake a culturally distinct group of well-educated individuals not fully integrated into the existing order -- the classical intelligentsia was the major source of political activity in the region.[62] Less a class in the Marxist sense than a Weberian "status group," the intelligentsia had a strong sense of itself as different from all other groups, including even those segments of the middle class that did not share its social and cultural commitments.[63] This strong sense of group identity encouraged the intelligentsia to think of itself as the "conscience of the nation" and facilitated collective action against the authorities.

In the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution, the "social space"[64] occupied by the classical Russian intelligentsia gradually disappeared. Within five years, the Bolshevik regime had consolidated its power, first eliminating its most actively counter-revolutionary foes and then proceeding on to repress those socialists who did not share its commitment to one-party rule. Among those repressed were revolutionary intellectuals, many of them Mensheviks, who continued to believe that it would be impossible to build socialism in a country as backward as Russia.[65] Within the confines of a Communist regime, overt political opposition -- including opposition from left-wing Communists with impeccable political credentials -- would simply not be tolerated. And in such an atmosphere, the classical Russian intelligentsia, with its commitment to critical thinking and its deep-seated mistrust of the authorities, was doomed to extinction.[66]

In thinking about the fate of the intelligentsia under Communist regimes, it is useful to distinguish among three segments of the intelligentsia: scientific, cultural, and political.[67]

Among students of Communist regimes, it is commonplace to distinguish, as do official state systems of classification, between the “creative” (e.g. literary and artistic) wing of the intelligentsia and its “technical and scientific wing” -- a distinction that in many ways parallels the distinction made by Weber in his remarks on “The ‘Rationalization’ of Education and Training” between the “cultivated man” and the “specialist.”[68] But a more refined analysis of the East European intelligentsia both prior to and under communism reveals that this dichotomous distinction misses a key segment of the intelligentsia whose place in society is captured neither by the “creative” nor the “scientific” category: this is the group of “political intellectuals” that includes both architects of communism such as Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky and oppositional activists such as Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuron.[69] Also belonging to this category, especially in the post-Stalin era, would be social scientists: the economists, sociologists, and political scientists whose areas of primary expertise had direct political implications. Reform economists such as the Czech Ota Sik, who while working within the Communist Party framework, favored “market socialism” over the tight central planning more typical of Communist regimes, would be examples of social scientists, who in general are more properly classified as members of the “political” rather than the “cultural” or scientific intelligentsia.[70]

Drawing upon this tripartite <u>horizontal</u> distinction between political, cultural, and technical segments of the intelligentsia and linking it to Lipset’s tripartate <u>vertical</u> distinction between those who create, transmit, and apply culture, one can conceptualize the intelligentsia of Communist societies (and perhaps of capitalist societies as well) as a relatively large social group broken into analytically (albeit not practically) distinct social locations; in the lexicon of social science, one could represent this conceptualization of the intelligentsia as a three-by-three table segmented and stratified into nine “cells.” For our purposes here, it is the top three cells -- those who create rather than transmit or apply culture -- that are most critical. And for the purpose of

understanding the political dynamics involved in the making and unmaking of Communist regimes, it is the first two segments -- the political and the cultural -- that are most critical.

The character of the relationship between Communist regimes and the three basic segments of the intelligentsia is in large part a function of two factors: the regime's degree of dependence on the type of knowledge possessed by a particular segment and the degree of political threat (actual or potential) that a particular segment poses to the regime's power. In general, the greater the regime's dependence on a specific segment, the more intense will be its efforts to reach an accommodation with that segment; conversely, the greater the political threat posed by a specific segment, the more repressive will be the regime's behavior. At the extremes, then, a segment of the intelligentsia low on threat and high on dependence is likely to enjoy relatively cooperative relations with the regime and should possess considerable bargaining power to advance its interests; conversely, a segment high on threat and low on dependence can expect difficult, even antagonistic, relations with the regime and should possess substantially less bargaining power.

This may seem a rather abstract formulation, but it can illuminate one of the most consistent patterns found in Communist societies: a reasonably cooperative, if frequently tense, relationship between the authorities and the non-Communist technical intelligentsia and a conflict-filled relationship between the authorities and the non-Communist political intelligentsia. Underpinning this pattern is a brute reality of power politics: for reasons of fundamental military and economic self-interest, Communist states need the knowledge possessed by non-Communist scientists, engineers, and military specialists, whereas the knowledge possessed by the non-Communist political intelligentsia is worse than useless to the authorities, for it constitutes a potentially serious threat to their grip on power. It is for this reason that Lenin and other Communist leaders have gone to great lengths to establish good working relationships with the technical intelligentsia; indeed, in a merciless world system

consisting of ferociously competing states, Communist regimes could not long survive without such a relationship.[71]

In sharp contrast to the non-Communist technical intelligentsia, the non-Communist political intelligentsia has little to offer Communist regimes and much to frighten them. Members of the political intelligentsia typically do not possess militarily or economically relevant expertise, but do possess knowledge of how to make political and ideological appeals that could mobilize segments of the population hostile to Communist power. The non-Communist political intelligentsia (except for those of its members who also possess technical expertise) is, in short, high on threat and low on dependence. Communist regimes thus characteristically move quickly to forcibly repress, or at least silence, all segments of the political intelligentsia not willing to follow the Party line.

Regime behavior towards the non-Communist cultural intelligentsia will in general be less harsh than their behavior towards the political intelligentsia, especially that portion of it involved in activities such as music and dance that have relatively few direct political implications. But Communist regimes will generally be less solicitous towards the cultural intelligentsia than towards the technical intelligentsia because they are less dependent on them; exceptions may be made for members of the cultural or "creative" intelligentsia such as renowned ballerinas or musicians, or chess masters whose performances are linked both domestically and internationally to the prestige of the state. In those segments of the cultural intelligentsia, however, whose normal activity can easily take on broader political implications (as in the case of writers and, in Russia and Eastern Europe, poets), the degree of surveillance and control will begin to approach that applied to the political intelligentsia.[72] And, as in the case of the political intelligentsia, those members of the cultural intelligentsia who are willing to propagate the ideological line of the regime can reap large material and symbolic rewards.[73]

As in the capitalist world, the ruling elite of Communist societies controls many incentives -- both positive and negative -- to encourage the intelligentsia to cooperate with the reigning authorities rather than to rebel against them. But in Leninist regimes, the mechanisms of social control are far more blunt-edged than the more impersonal, market-mediated mechanisms that prevail in capitalist societies. Simultaneously controlling both the economy and the state, the Party is at once the intelligentsia's principal patron and its primary oppressor. Unable to dispense with the intelligentsia yet never really trusting it, the Party/state systematically deploys both carrots and sticks in its efforts to keep the intelligentsia from becoming a locus of political opposition. While the regime's ultimate objective is to create a loyal and enthusiastic "people's intelligentsia," it will, if necessary, settle for the intelligentsia's political acquiescence.

In attempting to enlist the cooperation of the intelligentsia, the Party/state has at its disposal considerable resources. To those intellectuals who serve its purposes, Communist regimes can allocate high-status and relatively well-paid jobs; indeed, over time many of the highest position in the cultural, political, and scientific spheres, especially those with administrative responsibilities, became effectively closed to members of the intelligentsia not in the Party. Moreover, special privileges -- better housing, health care, and consumer goods -- await those intellectuals who actively cooperate with the authorities.[74] Yet while recognizing the importance of material rewards, it is crucial not to neglect, especially in the early, idealistic years after the seizure of power, the powerful appeal that participation in a great revolutionary movement dedicated to noble ideals held for segments of the intelligentsia. To these "progressive" members of the intelligentsia, working with the regime can confer a sense of being members of a selfless "vanguard" engaged in a grand historical project.[75]

Though the symbolic and material rewards controlled by the Party/state are substantial, they are not always sufficient to eliminate active political opposition within the intelligentsia.

When carrots fail, as is especially common in the period of contestation prior to the regime's consolidation of power, the stick is then applied -- sometimes with fatal results. To be sure, the Party/state controls many sanctions that it can apply to troublesome intellectuals that fall far short of death. Among these control mechanisms are devices ranging from censorship and loss of job, on the soft end of the spectrum, to forced emigration and imprisonment, on the harsher end. At the extreme, of course, reside torture and execution. Though Communist regimes differ in the extent to which they have relied on the more drastic forms of coercion, all of them have at times used force in their struggles with oppositional segments of the intelligentsia.

When the more extreme instruments of coercion (e.g. concentration camps, torture, and execution) become widely used and when they are deployed against not only "enemies of the revolution," but also genuine and alleged dissidents within the Party itself, then a full-fledged terror regime has emerged. The classical example of such a regime is the Soviet Union under Stalin,[76] but most Communist regimes have, at least for a time, utilized terror. For the intelligentsia, extensive regime reliance on terror means that the costs of dissent, never small under Communism, rapidly escalate to almost certain confinement in concentration camps and possible death, either from draconian prison conditions or from execution. One of the purposes of such terror is the total intimidation of anyone -- whether worker, peasant, student, or intellectual -- who dares to act against the regime. And though overt <u>individual</u> opposition to the Party/state may nonetheless take place under a terror regime, effective <u>collective</u> action is rendered impossible.

Put simply, terror works. Applied massively and systematically, it suffices to forestall any major manifestations of dissent from the intelligentsia. But in no Communist society has the period of mass terror been a permanent one, and in some -- perhaps Cuba is an example -- mass terror has never been the primary mechanism of social control. Instead, a wide array of rewards and sanctions are applied to promote loyalty, or at least conformity, within the intelligentsia.

Given the considerable benefits of compliance and the high costs of opposition, it is hardly surprising that most intellectuals -- including even those elite segments of the cultural and political intelligentsia most prone to dissent -- will reach an accommodation with the powers-that-be.

Compared to intellectuals with oppositional inclinations in democratic capitalist societies, intellectuals with similar tendencies under Communist regimes face a far more daunting task, for the Party/state controls both the economy and the means of cultural production, and its use of the repressive machinery of the state is less encumbered by legal restraints. Nevertheless, when mass terror recedes, as it did in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the years after Stalin's death, intellectuals did sometimes manage to overcome the formidable obstacles in their path and find ways to express public opposition to the existing order. Though often isolated from the general population, as they were under Brezhnev,[77] dissident intellectuals can at times articulate wider social and political grievances and help catalyze mass opposition to the established authorities. When they do so, they become a powerful force indeed -- one that threatens the very foundations of Communist rule.

Given the tremendous resources in the hands of the Party/state and the relative paucity of resources held by the intelligentsia, it would seem, at the very least, a steep uphill struggle for intellectuals in Communist societies to ever mount effective collective action. Yet instances of such collective action -- in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in Poland in 1980, in China and Eastern Europe in 1989 -- have undeniably taken place. And they have taken place despite the fact that three of the principal sources of "social power" identified by Michael Mann[78] -- military, economic, and political -- remained largely under control of the Party/state.

Faced with this apparently overwhelming concentration of military, economic, and political resources, what countervailing resources, if any, do intellectuals under Communist regimes hold? Reduced to essentials, there are basically two: knowledge resources and

interpretive resources. By “knowledge resources” are meant those areas of technical expertise possessed by intellectuals which enable them to speak authoritatively about the means which will permit the attainment of specific goals, especially economic, military, and technological ones; this is largely the province of the scientific and technical intelligentsia and, to a lesser extent, the social scientific portion of the the political intelligentsia. By “interpretive resources” are meant those areas of discursive competence which enable intellectuals to address questions of meaning, values, and historical possibilities; these resources speak less to matters of means than ends (e.g. ethically and morally appropriate goals of human action), and are largely the province of the cultural intelligentsia and the more overtly value-oriented portion of the political intelligentsia.

Because Communist regimes are dependent on the intelligentsia for essential economic and military expertise, that segment of it that possesses what might be called technical capital is able to carve out for itself relatively autonomous work conditions and a degree of space that can, under some conditions, be conducive to political dissent. Especially in those Communist societies whose geopolitical position makes the work of natural scientists of exceptional strategic importance, the scientific and technical intelligentsia may become a significant locus of political opposition; the prominence of Andrei Sakharov and Fang Lizhi[79] among dissidents in the Soviet Union and China, respectively, attests to this importance. Yet despite the potential leverage that the holders of technical capital possess vis-à-vis the authorities, most of them use this leverage for no purpose broader than a few material privileges and the capacity to pursue their scientific interests with minimal interference.

Because their expertise makes them useful to the regime and their tendency to focus on technical problems makes them relatively unthreatening, those members of the intelligentsia with applied knowledge, especially as it pertains to economic and military affairs, sometimes are incorporated into the ruling elite of the party. So, too, are some of the more technocratically oriented social scientists whose areas of expertise are particularly relevant to he tasks of the

intelligentsia in Communist societies as entirely distinct from, much less inherently antagonistic to, the bureaucrats who run the Party apparatus.[80] In reality, the two groups, however persistent the tension between them, become increasingly interpenetrated, with the "reds" accumulating more expertise and the "experts" joining the Party in growing numbers.

Yet it is doubtful whether the intelligentsia was ever on "the road to class power" in Communist societies, as Konrad and Szelenyi suggested in their classic 1974 work.[81] Instead, what seems to have happened in some Communist countries is that the ruling bureaucracy incorporated into its ranks a small segment of the intelligentsia, mostly from its scientific and technical wing, that possessed relevant expertise and showed evidence of loyalty to the Party and its "leading role" in society. At times -- most notably, in Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring and in Hungary during the 1970s -- that portion of the ruling elite that based its claims to power more on "expertise" than "redness" made attempts to reform the Communist system in the direction of a knowledge-based system of "market socialism." But these efforts, which may largely be identified with "intellectuals" rather than "bureaucrats" within the Party, were always ultimately repulsed, with the bureaucracy showing, as Szelenyi put it in the mid-1980s, an "almost suicidal stubbornness...about sharing their power in any meaningful way with anybody, even the technocracy."[82]

The critiques of the existing order mounted by members of the cultural and non-technocratic political intelligentsia were generally different in both content and consequence from the critiques offered by their counterparts in the technical and scientific intelligentsia. Based less on claims to superior knowledge and more on claims to being the bearers of fundamental values (or, to use the distinction made earlier, more reliant on "interpretive" than "knowledge" resources), dissidents from the cultural intelligentsia questioned not only the efficiency of Communist regimes, but their goals and their morality. At its most powerful, as in the works of such figures as Solzhenitsyn and Havel,[83] the dissent voiced by the more radical

members of the cultural intelligentsia brought sharply into question every key aspect of the official ideology: its version of history, its portrait of contemporary reality, and its vision of the future. Whether in the form of fiction or essays, this was a critique that went far beyond technical matters to address basic issues of morality and meaning. Though distributed only in samizdat form and hence restricted in circulation, such critiques had the capacity to shake the ideological foundations of the entire Communist system.

In launching their assault on the Party/state, dissident members of the intelligentsia in Russia and Eastern Europe were able to draw on national cultural repertoires that allocated to intellectuals the role of "conscience of the nation."[84] Though decades of Communist power had succeeded in producing a "new socialist intelligentsia" quite different from the classical intelligentsia, some members of this new intelligentsia (as well as a few surviving individuals of the old intelligentsia) assigned to themselves an expansive social and political role that resonated with older images of the intelligentsia's "true mission." Such images still retained considerable popular currency, as evidenced by the immense moral authority accumulated by such figures as Havel and Sakharov. Particularly in the years after the terror associated with Stalin had receded, a social space occupied by dissident intellectuals, some of them reformist and others more radical, opened up in many Communist regimes.

Occupying this dissenting space was not without serious costs, especially for the bolder and more radical oppositional intellectuals. In a common pattern, prominent dissidents such as Havel, Michnik, and Sakharov would publicly test the regime's limits of tolerance. At some point, these limits would be transgressed and imprisionment would result. Incarceration, in turn, would enhance the dissidents' public stature, for it demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice for one's beliefs that stood in stark contrast to the increasingly cynical and corrupt authorities who had long since abandoned any vestiges of revolutionary idealism. For the regime, the unintended consequence of this process was that it enabled leading dissidents to accumulate vast amounts of

what might be called moral capital -- a resource that permits one to speak forcefully and convincingly to a wider public on fundamental issues of morality and truth. This was an invaluable asset for intellectuals locked in struggle with the authorities, and they were to deploy it with considerable effectiveness.

Though the Party/state continued to monopolize economic and political resources (including the means of coercion), the oppositional intelligentsia now controlled a wealth of normative resources. Richer than ever before in moral capital, their task was less to undermine the moral standing of the authorities -- which was in any case already low -- than to convince their fellow citizens that open opposition was at once feasible and fruitful.

The outlines of such a strategy were laid out in Havel's brilliant 1978 essay, "The Power of the Powerless."[85] But the decisive practical step forward had been taken two years earlier in Poland, with the founding in September 1976 of KOR (the Committee for Workers' Self-Defense), by leading members of the oppositional intelligentsia.[86] Whereas in previous years dissidents would issue passionate, and sometimes abstract, denunciations of the established authorities, KOR would now offer victims of the Party/state concrete, practical assistance; moreover, whereas the specific demands of dissident intellectuals had previously centered around issues such as censorship that are of special interest to the intelligentsia, now KOR would take up as its principal activity the cause of workers and their right to self-organization without repression. This was a strategy, then, of deploying the moral capital laboriously accumulated by such long-time dissidents as Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik in the service of the construction of a cross-class alliance -- an alliance that would have the power to challenge the Party/state that oppositional intellectuals, acting on their own, could never attain. The historic birth in August 1980 of Solidarity, the first independent trade union in a Communist country, was the ultimate product of this effort, but the process of getting there was a long and circuitous one, with the

exceptional militancy and resourcefulness of the Polish working class (which had risen on its own against the authorities in 1956, 1970, and 1976) its indispensable precondition.[87]

Yet in the final analysis the greatest impact of the moral and political critique mounted by the oppositional intelligentsia may, paradoxically, have resided less in its effect on the masses than on the elite of the Party/state itself. For by the time Communism collapsed in 1989, the moral and ideological foundations of Communist rule had eroded so badly that even members of the apparatus itself were suffering a profound crisis of self-confidence. As Weber pointed out in another context, "he who is more favored feels the never ceasing need to look upon his position as in some way 'legitimate,' upon his advantages as 'deserved'"[88]; for the apparatchiki of Communist regimes in Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the ideology of Marxism-Leninism had long provided the philosophical and political legitimation that justified both their rule and the privileges that emanated therefrom. By the late 1980s, that ideology was effectively dead, killed not only by the relentless assaults of the oppositional intelligentsia, but also by the decline of Marxism among the official regime intelligentsia and the self-doubt that had come to afflict even leading members of the apparatus. Bereft of plausible justification of their rule and faced with increasingly assertive populations, the elites of Communist Eastern Europe faced a stark choice: either the massive deployment of force or the peaceful surrender of power. When push came to shove, most of them no longer had the faith that would permit them to order the guns to fire. And those -- most notably, Ceausescu and Milosevic -- did so less in the name of Commanism than of nationalism.

However important the contribution of some segments of the East European intelligentsia was to the undermining of the political and ideological foundations of Communist rule, it must not be forgotten that the bulk of its members managed to reach an accommodation with the Party/state. In this regard, the East European intelligentsia was not, to be sure, behaving aberrantly, for most intellectuals under most circumstances will -- as the "realist" perspective

outlined as the beginning of this paper argued -- adopt a stance of accommodation rather than resistance to established authorities. In Eastern Europe, the oppositional intelligentsia undeniably played a major role in the demise of Communist regimes. Yet as Zygmunt Bauman has noted, if the "omniscient cultural pretensions of political powers" constitute the Scilla of the contemporary intellectual, then the "all-devouring ignorance of the cultural merchants translating as 'market demand'" constitutes its Charybdis.[89] Having lived for so long with Scilla, perhaps Charybdis, with all its dangers, seems like a welcome change to many Eastern European intellectuals. In any event, under the crushing pressure of international economic and political forces, the dream once dear to the dissidents of Eastern Europe of steering a middle course between them -- a "third way" that would be neither capitalist nor socialist -- now seems like little more than a distant memory.

Footnotes

[1] Vaclav Havel, *Disturbing the Peace: A Conversation with Karel Hvizdala* (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 167.

[2] For analyses of the birth of the modern "intellectual" during the Dreyfus case which shook France in the 1890s (and of Zola's prominent role in organizing "les intellectuels"), see Lewis A. Coser, *Men of Ideas: A Sociologist's Views* (New York: The Free Press, 1970), 215-225; and Christophe Charle, *Naissance des "intellectuels," 1880-1900* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1990). For key contributions to the debate about the problem of intellectuals, see Julien Benda, *The Treason of the Intellectuals* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1969); George Orwell, "Writers and Leviathan," in George B. de Huszar, editor, *The Intellectuals: A Controversial Portrait* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960); Leszek Kolakowski, *Marxism and Beyond: On Historical Understanding and Individual Responsibility* (London: Paladin, 1971), and "Intellectuals Against Intellect," *Daedalus* **vol** (Winter 1972); and Alan Montefiore, "The political responsibility of intellectuals," in Ian Maclean, Alan Montefiore, and Peter Winch, editors, *The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Ignazio Silone's remarks about the responsibility of the intellectual were contained in a speech delivered before the International PEN Club Conference at Basle, "On the Place of Intellect and the Pretensions of the Intellectual," in George B. de Huszat, editor, *The Intellectuals: A Controversial Portrait* (Glencoe, Illinios: The Free Press, 1960), 261-266.

[3] Edward W. Said, *Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994), xvi, 85-102.

[4] Robert Michels, "Intellectuals," in Edwin R. A. Seligman, editor, *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1937), vol 8, and *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Olifarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, 2nd ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1968); Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1949), and *Essays on the Sociology of Culture* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1971); C. Wright Mills, *Power, Politics, and People: The Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills*, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man: The*

Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, New Jersey: Anchor Books, 1963); Seymour M. Lipset and Richard B. Dobson, "The Intellectual as Critic and Rebel: With Special Reference to the United States and the Soviet Union," *Daedalus* 101/3 (1972): 137-198; Alvin W. Gouldner, "Prologue to a Theory of Revolutionary Intellectuals," *Telos* 26 (Winter 1975-1976):3-36, *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class* Vol 2. of *The Dark Side of the Dialectic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), and *Against Fragmentation: The Origins of Marxism and the Sociology of Intellectuals* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Robert J.Brym, *Intellectuals and Politics* (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1980); Ivan Szelenyi, "The Intelligentsia in the Class Structure of State-Socialist Societies," American Journal of Sociology 88 (Supplement 1982): S287-326, and "The Prospects and Limits of the East European New Class Project: An Auto-critical Reflection on *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*," *Politics and Society* 15/2 (1986-1987): 103-144; George Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power: A Sociological Study of the Role of the Intelligentsia in Socialism* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979); Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1984), "The Corporatism of the Universal: The Role of Intellectuals in the Modern World" *Telos* 81 (Fall 1989): 99-110, and *La noblesse d'Etat. Grands corps et Grandes ecoles* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1989); Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J. D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Zygmunt Bauman, *Legislators and Interpreters* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987), "Love in Adversity: On the State and the Intellectuals, and the State of the Intellectuals," *Thesis Eleven* 31(1992): 81-104.

[5] Michels, *Oligarchical Tendencies*, 353.

[6] Ibid., 107-109.

[7] Ibid., 367.

[8] Michels, "Intellectuals," 119.

[9] Karl Mannheim, who may with Robert Michels be considered the co-founder of the modern sociology of intellectuals, echoed Michels' conclusion about the heterogeneous political commitments of intellectuals, arguing in *Ideology and Utopia* that they may be found "in all camps," serving as theorists for "conservatives," for the "proletariat" (who "lacked the prerequisites for the acquisition of the knowledge

necessary for modern political conflict"), and for the "liberal bourgeoisie" (Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, 141). Mannheim's most systematic attempt to explain the diverse political orientations of intellectuals is contained, however, not in *Ideology and Utopia*, but in a pathbreaking essay, "The Problem of the Intelligentsia." In it he argues, against classical Marxist interpretations, that class position was only one determinant (albeit an important one) of political ideology, with such factors as social background, ethnicity, religion, sex, age, education, mobility, and patterns of association and institutional affiliation also playing important roles (Mannheim, *Sociology of Culture*, 91-170). The present analysis differs, however, from Mannheim in its skepticism about his concept of relatively "detached intellectuals" and its rejection of his belief that the intelligentsia is under all circumstances "incapable of concerted action" (Ibid., 104).

[10] Bauman, "Love in Adversity," 81.

[11] Bauman, *Legislators and Interpreters*, 8.

[12] Bauman, "Love in Adversity," 85.

[13] Explaining his refusal to participate in the recurrent controversy about who is and is not an "intellectual," Bauman describes the debate as "either an element of power rhetoric developed by some sectors of the category to serve the 'closure' struggles, or the result of outsiders confusing power rhetoric with sociological analysis" (Bauman, *Legislators and Interpreters*, 18-19). Bauman's debt to Foucault here, as elsewhere, is obvious; for Foucault's own most explicit attempt to deal with the problem of intellectuals, see *Power/Knowledge*: *Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980). On the question of the stakes that various groups have in different schemas of social classification, see Pierre Bourdieu, "The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups," *Theory and Society* 14/6 (1985): 723-744.

[14] Said, *Representations of the Intellectual*, 11.

[15] Richard Hofstadter *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), 27.

[16] The phrase is borrowed from the title of Edward Shils' influential 1958 essay, "The Intellectuals and the Powers," reprinted in a useful volume that brings together many of his essays, written from a comparative and historical perspective, on intellectuals, Edward Shils, *"The Intellectals and the Powers" and Other Essays* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972).

[17] Lipset, *Political Man*, 333.

[18] Lipset and Dobson, “The Intellectual as Critic and Rebel,” 138; Coser, *Men of Ideas*, viii.

[19] We will take up the issue of the differences between “intellectuals” and “intelligentsia,” especially as these terms pertain to both Eastern Europe and Communist regimes later in the paper. In the case of the United States, Lipset argues that the “intelligentsia” refers to only the first two groups (i.e. the producers and distributors, but not the appliers of culture, whereas in Europe it commonly refers to all three (Lipset, *Political Man*, 333). More recently, however, a number of analysts -- among them, Alvin Gouldner (“Revolutionary Intellectuals,” *Future of Intellectuals,*and *Against Fragmentation*)--- have used the term “intelligentsia” to refer to all three groups. In keeping with this usage, this paper will refer to all three groups when using the term “intelligentsia,” especially as it applies to the United States and Western Europe.

[20] Bauman, *Legislators and Interpreters*, 19.

[21] Katherine Verdery, *National Ideology Under Socialism: Identitiy and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu’s Romania* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), 16-17.

[22] On the distinction between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” domination, see Max Weber, *Economy and Society* Vols. 1 and 2, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, editors (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978).

[23] Micheal Mann, *The Rise of the Nation-States, 1760-1914* Vol 2 of *The Sources of Social Power* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 1-2, 136-739.

[24] Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Reflexive Sociology*, 192.

[25] In a discussion deeply indebted to Weber’s theoretical work on stratification and power, Parkin writes that “social closure” may be defined as “the process by which social collectivities seek to maximize rewards by restricting access to resources and opportunities to a limited circle of eligibles.” Within this framework, “credentialism as a form of exclusionary closure” is “comparable in its importance for class formation to the institution of property.” For closure theorists, the “dominant class” in modern capitalist societies, includes not only those “who possess or control productive capital,” but also “those who possess a legal monopoly of professional services” (Frank Parkin, *Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 44, 58). From this perspective, credentialed intellectuals should be viewed as belonging to the dominant social group of advanced societies. In addition to Parkin, other

analysts who have been labeled closure theorists include Randall Collins, *The Credential Society* (New York: Academic Press, 1979); Bourdieu, "Culture and Social Reproduction," in Jerome Karabel and A.H. Halsey, editors, *Power and Ideology in Education* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 487-511; Bourdieu, *Distinction*; Bourdieu, *La noblesse*; Gouldner, *Future of Intellectuals*; and Raymond Murphy, *Social Closure* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); for an analysis and critique of closure theory, see Jeff Manza, "Classes, Status Groups, and Social Closure: A Critique of Neo-Weberian Social Theory," *Perspectives in Social Theory* 12 (1992), 275-302.

[26] Bourdieu, "The intellectual field: a world apart," Chapter 9 of *In Other Words* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 145.

[27] For a lucid discussion of Bourdieu's concept of "field," see Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Reflexive Sociology*, 17-18.

[28] Bauman, "Love in Adversity," 91.

[29] Weber, *Economy and Society*, 953.

[30] On the role of intellectuals in the revolutionary upheavals of 1789, 1848, 1917, and 1989, see, respectively, Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* (New York: Doubleday, 1955); Lewis Namier, *1848: The Revolution of the Intellectuals* (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1964); Richard Pipes, *The Russian Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 121-152; and Timothy Garton Ash, *The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of '89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague* (New York: Random House, 1990).

[31] In contrast to Mann, whose "IEMP model of power organization" (ideological, economic, military, and political) draws a sharp distinctions between "military power" and "state power," the model of society put forward in this paper groups them together because the coercive capacity of the military is located within the state and provides the ultimate foundation of its power. Indeed, for Weber the state is precisely "a human community that (successfully) claims <u>the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force</u> within a given territory" (Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, editors, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 78, emphasis in the original). Within this tripartite model, cultural power (the analogue to Mann's "ideological power") is the primary source of whatever social power intellectuals possess; in most circumstances, economic and political power are in the hands of other social

groups. Each of these types of power is characteristically based on a distinctive mode of control: for political power, this mode of control is coercive (the capacity to deploy the means of violence); for economic power, it is material (the ability to bestow or withhold economic rewards); and for cultural power, it is normative (control over moral imperatives and societal norms); see Verdery, *National Ideology*, 85-86; Brym, *Intellectuals and Politics*, 26).

[32] Antonio Gramsci, *Selections From the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, 2nd ed., Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, editors (New York: International Publishers, 1973), 5. On Gramsci's theory of intellectuals, see also Jerome Karabel, "Revolutionary Contradictions: Antonio Gramsci and the Problem of Intellectuals" in *Politics and Society* 6 (1976), 123-172; Walter L. Adamson, *Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci's Political and Cultural Theory* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983); and Joseph V. Femia, *Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).

[33] Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, 157.

[34] Brym, *Intellectuals and Politics*, 31.

[35] Ron Eyerman, *Between Culture and Politics: Intellectuals in Modern Society* (Cambridge; Massachusetts: Polity Press, 1994).

[36] Joseph Ben-David, "The Growth of the Professions and the Class System," in *Current Sociology* 12 (1963-1964): 247-330.

[37] Magali Sarfatti Larson, *The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), xviii.

[38] Konrad and Szelenyi, *Class Power*; Szelenyi, "Class Structure."

[39] Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, 168.

[40] Marzio Barbagli, *Educating for Unemployment: Politics, Labor Markets, and the School System--Italy, 1859-1973* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Walter T. Kotschnig, *Unemployment and the Learned Professions* (London: Oxford University Press, 1937).

[41] Michels, "Intellectuals," 122.

[42] Joseph Rothschild, *Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe Since World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Craig Calhoun, *Neither Gods Nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle for Democracy in China* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995).

[43] Brym, *Intellectuals and Politics*, 17.

[44] Jerome Karabel, "The Revolt of the Intellectuals: The Prague Spring and the Politics of Reform Communism," in forthcoming *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts, and Change*, 1995.

[45] Among the voluminous body of literature on the New Left and its opposition to the Vietnam War, two of the best works are those by Todd Gitlin, *The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage* (New York: Bantam Books, 1987), and James Miller, *"Democracy is in the Streets": From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago* (New York: Touchstone, 1987).

[46] Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

[47] In a suggestive passage, Weber wrote that "just as those who wield power in the polity invoke the idea of the state, the intellectuals...are specifically predestined to propagate the 'national' idea" (Weber, *Economy and Society*, 925-926, emphasis in the original).

[48] Andrzej Walicki, *The Controversy Over Capitalism* (South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989); Philip Pomper, *The Russian Revolutionary Intelligensia* (Arlington Heights, Illinois: AHM Publishing Corporation, 1970).

[49] Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland, Volume II, 1975 to the Present* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).

[50] Weber, *Economy and Society*, 926-940.

[51] **Ory, Pascal, and Jean-François Sirinelli**, *Les intellectuels en France, de l'Affaire Dreyfus a nos jours* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1986).

[52] Bauman, *Legislators and Interpreters*, 34.

[53] Alexander Bloom, *Prodigal Sons: New York Intellectuals and their World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Alan M. Wald, *The New York Intellectuals: The Rise and Decline of the Anti-Stalinist Left from the 1930's to the 1980's* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987).

[54] Aleksander Gella, "The Life and Death of the Old Polish Intelligensia," in *Slavic Review* 30/1 (1971): 1-27.

[55] Davies, *God's Playground*.

[56] Daniel Singer, *Prelude to a Revolution: France in May 1968* (London: Hill and Wang, 1970); Alain Touraine, *The May Movement* (New York: Random House, 1971).

[57] Calhoun, *Democracy in China*.

[58] While scholars agree that Poland and Russia were the birthplace of the "intelligentsia," there is disagreement over the linguistic origins of the term. Martin Malia, in an influential essay entitled "What is the Intellegentsia?" in Richard Pipes, editor, *The Russian Intelligentsia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 1; claims that "the term was introduced into the Russian language in the 1860's by a minor novelist named Boborykin." Another leading student of the intelligentsia, Aleksander Gella, *Polish Intelligentsia*, 4, offers evidence, however, that the renowned Russian critic Belinsky already was using the term in 1846 and that a Polish writer named Libelt had employed in as early as 1844. But whatever its precise linguistic origins, one thing is clear: that the term "intelligentsia" came into being in Eastern Europe at roughly the same time that it was emerging as a distinct social group.

[59] Kendall E. Bailes, *Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin: Origins of the Soviet Techincal Intelligentsia, 1917-1941* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978); Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1992). In recent years, the term "intelligentsia" has taken on a broad official meaning in the state socialist societies of Eastern Europe. In contrast to the "classical" East Eruopean intelligentsia, the so-called "working intelligentsia" is a far larger group consisting of individuals "who are professionally employed in the performance of highly-qualified mental labor which requires specialized secondary or higher education" (Rutkevich, quoted in Lipset and Dobson, *Critic and Rebel*, 189-190). The "working intelligentsia" of the state socialist countries is roughly comparable, it is worth noting, to the credentialed, but non-propertied "new middle class" of the advanced capitalist countries.

[60] Garton Ash, *The Magic Lantern*; Daniel Chirot, editor, *The Crisis of Leninism and the Decline of the Left: The Revolution of 1989* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991); Ivo Banac, editor, *Eastern Europe in Revolution* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1992).

[61] Alexander Hertz, “The Case of Eastern European Intelligentsia,” *Journal of Central European Affairs* 11 (1951): 10-26; Richard Pipes, “The Historical Evolution of the Russian Intelligentsia,” in Richard Pipes, editor, *The Russian Intelligentsia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 47-62; Malia, “What is the Intelligentsia?”; Gella, *Polish Intelligentsia,* and “The Russian and Polish Intelligentsias: A Sociological Perspective,” *Studies in Soviet Thought* 19 (1979): 307-320.

[62] Konrad and Szelenyi, *Class Power.*

[63] On “status groups,” see Weber, *Economy and Society*, 931-939.

[64] See Bourdieu, “The Social Space,” for an explication of the concept of “social space.”

[65] Leonard Schapiro, *The Origin of the Communist Autocracy: Political Opposition in the Soviet State, 1917-1922* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966); Robert Vincent Daniels*, The Conscience of the Revolution: Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960); Lewis H. Siegelbaum*, Soviet State and Society Between Revolutions, 1918-1929* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Shiela Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

[66] As early as 1930, William Henry Chamberlain, author of the classic two-volume study*, The Russian Revolution, 1971-1921*, was writing about “The Tragedy of the Russian Intelligentsia” (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1930), 339-351. Apart from the Bolshevik Revolution itself and the ensuing civil war, two other decisive blows were delivered to the classical Russian intelligentsia, both Marxist and non-Marxist: the “Cultural Revolution” of 1928-1931 and the “Great Purge” of 1936-1938. On the Cultural Revolution, see Shiela Fitzpatrick, editor, *Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928-1931* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1984); on the Great Purge, see Roy Medvedev*, Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism*, ed. George Shriver (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); for a work spanning both events, see the second volume of Robert C. Tucker’s biography of Stalin, *Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1992).

[67] The attempt in the following pages to theorize about the place of intellectuals in Communist regimes is based in part on the results of four case studies on intellectuals in Russian and Eastern Europe: the construction of a “new socialist intelligentsia” in the Soviet Union between 1917 and 1939, the Prague Spring of 1968, the Solidarity movement of 1980-1981, and the reform movement in the Soviet Union from

1985 to 1991. These four cases are part of a larger book manuscript tentatively titled *The Vanquished Vanguard: Intellectuals in the Making and Unmaking of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe.*

[68] Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 240-245.

[69] See Adam Michnik, *L'Eglise et la Gauche: le dialogue polonais* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1979); and Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski, "An Open Letter to the Party," *New Politics* 5/2 (1966): 5-46, and "An Open Letter to the Party II," *New Politics* 5/3 (1967): 73-99.

[70] For an analysis of the role of "political" intellectuals in the Polish Solidarity movement and the Prague Spring, see Jerome Karabel, "The Origins of Solidarity: Workers, Intellectuals, and the Making of an Oppositional Movement," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies (formerly Studies in Comparative Communism)* 26 (March 1993); and Karabel, "Revolt of the Intellectuals."

[71] On Lenin's ideas about science and technology, see Carmen Claudin-Urondo, *Lenin and the Cultural Revolution*, translator, Brian Pearce (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1977); for historical studies of his actual treatment of scientists and engineers, see Bailes, *Technology and Society*; and Nicholas Lampert, *The Technical Intelligentsia and the Soviet State: A Study of Soviet Managers and Technicians 1928-1935* (New York: The Macmillian Press, 1979).

[72] John Garrard and Carol Garrard, *Inside the Soviet Writers' Union* (New York: The Free Press, 1990).

[73] Mervyn Matthews, *Privilege in the Soviet Union: A Study of Elite Life-Styles under Communism* (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1978).

[74] Micheal Voslenskyk, *Nomenklatura: Anatomy of the Soviet Ruling Class* (London: Bodley Head, 1984); Matthews, *Elite Life-Styles*.

[75] The magnetic force of Marxist ideology to idealistic members of the intelligentsia is a recurring theme in the memoirs and autobiographies of Communists and former Communists. For the Russian case, three of the richest of these memoirs are Victor Serge, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary*, translator, Peter Sedgwick (New York: Writers and Readers Publishing, Inc., 1984); Lev Kopelev, *The Education of a True Believer* (New York: Harper and Row, 1980); and Eugenia Semyonovna Ginzburg, *Journey into the Whirlwind* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1967).

[76] Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: A Reassessment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); J. Arch Getty and Roberta T. Manning, *Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives* (New York: Cambridge University

Press, 1993); Medvedev, *Let History Judge*; Robert C. Tucker, editor*, Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1977); Gouldner, "Stalinism: A Study of Internal Colonialism," *Telos* 34 (Winter 1977-1978): 5-48.

[77] Brym, *Intellectuals and Politics*, 29-31.

[78] Mann, *Rise of Classes*.

[79] Andrei D. Sakharov, *From Gorky to Moscow and Beyond* (New York: Knopf, 1990), and *Moscow and Beyond: 1986-1989* (New York: Knopf, 1991); Fang Lizhi, *Bringing Down the Great Wall* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1992).

[80] For a theoretically elegant expression of this viewpoint, see Frank Parkin, "System Contradiction and Political Transformation," *Archives Europeennes de Sociologie* 13 (1972): 45-62.

[81] *Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* was finished in manuscript form in September 1974 and was confiscated by the Hungarian police a few days later. Its authors spent a week in jail; as they noted in the preface to the English edition, "twenty years earlier we could have been executed for the same piece of work" (Konrad and Szelenyi, *Class Power*, xviii). Szelenyi left Hungary for London in May 1975 and migrated to Australia in 1976; Konrad remained in Budapest, where he continued to write novels -- a particularly revealing example of how much some of the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe had changed since the Stalin years.

[82] Szelenyi, "New Class Project." For a critique of the "new class" thesis as put foreward by Konrad and Szelenyi, see Janina Frentzel-Zagorska and Krzysztof Zagorska, "East European Intellectuals on the Road of Dissent: The Old Prophecy of a New Class Re-examined," *Politics and Society* 17/1 (1989): 67-88.

[83] Solzhenitsyn's most political work is, of course, *The Gulag Archipelago*, but some of his works of fiction -- notably, *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, The First Circle*, and *The Cancer Ward* (all written while he was still in Russia) -- seriously undermined the official ideology of the regime. Havel first came to prominence as a playright -- the satirical plays *The Garden Party* and *The Memorandum* were both written in the 1960s, before he was 30 -- but his greatest political impact as a writer came from his samizdat essays, most notably *The Power of the Powerless*, and his book of autobiographical interviews, *Disturbing the Peace*.

[84] Frank L. Kaplan, "The Writer as Political Actor in Czechoslovak Society: A Historical Perspective," *East European Quarterly* 7/2 (1973): 199-220; Gella, "Polish Intelligentsia," and "Russian and Polish Intelligentsias."

[85] Vaclav Havel, et al., *The Power of the Powerless: Citizens Against the State in Central-Eastern Europe*, ed. John Keane (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1985).

[86] Jan Josef Lipski, *KOR: The Worker's Self Defense Committee* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985).

[87] Roman Laba, *The Roots of Solidarity: A Political Sociology of Poland's Working Class Democratization* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Lawrence Goodwyn*, Breaking the Barrier: The Rise of Solidarity in Poland* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Karabel, "The Origins of Solidarity."

[88] Weber, *Economy and Society*.

[89] Bauman, "Love in Adversity," 93.

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[1] Havel (1990: 167)

[2] For analyses of the birth of the modern "intellectual" during the Dreyfus case which shook France in the 1890s (and of Zola's prominent role in organizing "les intellectuels"), see Coser (1965: 215-225) and Charle (1990). For key contributions to the debate about the problem of intellectuals, see Benda (1927), Orwell (1960), Kolakowski (1973), and Montefiore (1990). Silone's remarks about the responsibility of the intellectual were contained in a speech delivered before the International PEN Club Conference at Basle, "On the Place of Intellect..." (1960).

[3] Said (1994: xvi, 85-102).

[4] Michels (1932; 1962); Mannheim (1936; 1956); Mills (1962); Lipset (1960); Lipset and Dobson (1972); Gouldner (1975-1976; 1979; 1985); Brym (1980); Szelenyi (1982; 1986-1987); Konrad and Szelenyi (1979); Bourdieu (1984; 1989a; 1989b); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992); Bauman (1987; 1992).

[5] Michels (1962: 353).

[6] Michels (1962: 107-109).

[7] Michels (1962: 367).

[8] Michels (1932: 119).

[9] Karl Mannheim, who may with Robert Michels be considered the co-founder of the modern sociology of intellectuals, echoed Michels' conclusion about the heterogeneous political commitments of intellectuals, arguing in Ideology and Utopia that they may be found "in all camps," serving as theorists for "conservativs," for the "proletariat" (who "lacked the prerequisites for the acquisition of the knowledge necessary for modern political conflict"), and for the "liberal bourgeoisie" (Mannheim, 1936: 141). Mannheim's most systematic attempt to explain the diverse political orientations of intellectuals is contained, howwever, not in Ideology and Utopia, but in a pathbreaking essay, "The Problem of the Intelligentsia." In it he argues, against classical Marxist interpretations, that class position was only one determinant (albeit an important one) of political ideology, with such factors as social background, ethnicity, religion, sex, age, education, mobility, and patterns of association and institutional affilitation also playing important roles (Mannheim, 1956: 91-170). The present analysis differs, however, from Mannheim in its skepticism about his concept of relatively "detached intellectuals" and its rejection of his belief that the intelligentsia is under all circumstances "incapable of concerted action" (Mannheim, 1956: 104).

[10] Bauman (1992: 81).

[11] Bauman (1987: 8).

[12] Bauman (1992: 85).

[13] Explaining his refusal to participate in the recurrent controversy about who is and is not an "intellectual," Bauman describes the debate as "either an element of power rhetoric develeoped by some sectors of the category to serve the 'closure' struggles, or the result of outsiders confusing power rhieoric wiht sociological analysis" (Bauman, 1987: 18-19). Bauman's debt to Foucault here, as elsewhere, is abvious; for Foucault's own most explicit attempt to deal with the problem of intellectuals, see Power/Knowledge (1980). On the question of the stakes that various groups have in different schemas of social classification, see Bourdieu (1985).

[14] Said (1994: 11).

[15] Hofstadter (1970: 27).

[16] The phrase is borrowed from the title of Edward Shils' influential 1958 essay, "The Intellectuals and the Powers," reprinted in a useful volume that brings together many of his essays, written from a comparative and historical perspective, on intellectuals (Shils, 1972).

[17] Lipset (1960: 333).

[18] Lipset and Dobson (1972: 138); Coser (1969; viii).

[19] We will take up the issue of the differences between "intellectuals" and "intelligentsia," especially as these terms pertain to both Eastern Europe and Communist regimes later in the paper. In the casse of the United States, Lipset argues that the "intelligentsia" refers to only the first two groups (i.e. the producers and distributors, but not the appliers of culture, shereas in Europe it commonly refers to all three (Lipset, 1960: 333). More recently, however, a number of analysts -- among them, Alvin Gouldner (1975-1976; 1979; 1985) -- have used the term "intelligentsia" to refer to all three groups. In keeping withthis usage, this paper will refer to all three groups when using the term "intelligentsia," especially as it applies to the United States and Western Europe.

[20] Bauman (1987: 19).

[21] Verdery (1991: 16-17).

[22] On the distinction between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" domination, see Max Weber (1978).

[23] Mann (1993: 1-2, 136-739).

[24] Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 192).

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[29] Weber (1978: 953).

[30] On the role of intellectuals in the revolutionary unheavals of 1789, 1848, 1917, and 1989, see, respectively, Tocqueville (1955); Namier (1964); Pipes (1990: 121-152); and Garton Ash (1990).

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[32] Gramsci (1971: 5). On Gramsci's theory of intellectuals, see also Karabel (1976), Adamson (1980); Femia (1981); and Boggs (1984).

[33] Mannheim (1956: 157).

[34] Brym (1980: 31).

[35] Eyerman (1994).

[36] Ben-David (1963-1964).

[37] Larson (1977: xviii).

[38] Konrad and Szelenyi (1979); Szelenyi (1982).

[39] Mannheim (1956: 168).

[40] Barbagli (1979); Kotschnig (1937).

[41] Michels (1932: 122).

[42] Rothschild (1989); Calhoun (1995).

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[45] Among the voluminous body of literature on the New Left and its opposition to the Vietnam War, two of the best works are those by Gitlin (1987) and Miller (1987).

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[48] Walicki (1989); Pomper (1970).

[49] Davies (1984).

[50] Weber (1978: 926-940).

[51] Ory and Sirinelli (1986).

[52] Bauman (1978: 34).

[53] Bloom (1986); Wald (1987).

[54] Gella (1971).

[55] Davies (1984).

[56] Singer (1970); Touraine (1971).

[57] Calhoun (1991).

[58] While scholars agree that Poland and Russia were the birthplace of the "intelligentsia," there is disagreement over the linguistic origins of the term. Malila (1961: 1), in an influential essay entitled "What is the Intellegentsia?" claims that "the term was introduced into the Russian language in the 1860's by a minor novelist named Boborykin." Another leading student of the student, Aleksander Gella (1971: 4), offers evidence, however, that the renowned Russian critic Belinsky already was using the term in 1846 and that a Polish writer named Libett had employed in as early as 1844. But whatever its precise linguist orignis, one thing is clear: that the term "intelligentsia" came into being in Eastern Europe at roughly the same time that it was emerging as a distinct social group.

[59] Bailes (1978); Fitzpatrick (1992). In recent years, the term "intelligentsia" has taken on a broad official meaning in the state socialist societies of Eastern Europe. In contrast to the "classical" East Eruopean intelligentsia, the so-called "working intelligentsia" is a far larger group consisting of individuals "who are professionally employed in the performance of highly-qualified mental labor which requires specialized secondary or higher education" (Rutkevich, quoted in Lipset and Dobson, 1972: 189-190). The "working intelligentsia" of the state socialist countries is roughly comparable, it is worth noting, to the credentialed, but non-propertied "new middle class" of the advanced capitalist countries of the West.

[60] Garton Ash (1990); Chirot (1992); Banac (1992).

[61] Hertz (1951); Pipes (1961); Malia (1961); Gella (1971; 1979).

[62] Konrad and Szelenyi (1979).

[63] On "status groups," see Weber (1978: 931-939).

[64] See Bourdieu (1985) for an explication of the concept fo "social space."

[65] Schapiro (1955); Daniels (1960); Siegelbaum (1992); Fitzpatrick (1994).

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Footnotes

[1] Havel (1991: 167)

[2] For analyses of the birth of the modern "intellectual" during the Dreyfus case which shook France in the 1890s (and of Zola's prominent role in organizing "les intellectuels"), see Coser (1970: 215-225) and Charle (1990). For key contributions to the debate about the problem of intellectuals, see Benda (1927), Orwell (1960), Kolakowski (1973), and Montefiore (1990). Silone's remarks about the responsibility of the intellectual were contained in a speech delivered before the International PEN Club Conference at Basle, "On the Place of Intellect..." (1960).

[3] Said (1994: xvi, 85-102).

[4] Michels (1937; 1968); Mannheim (1948; 1971); Mills (1962); Lipset (1963); Lipset and Dobson (1972); Gouldner (1975-1976; 1979; 1985); Brym (1980); Szelenyi (1982; 1986-1987); Konrad and Szelenyi (1979); Bourdieu (1984; 1989a; 1989b); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992); Bauman (1987; 1992).

[5] Michels (1968: 353).

[6] Michels (1968: 107-109).

[7] Michels (1968: 367).

[8] Michels (1937: 119).

[9] Karl Mannheim, who may with Robert Michels be considered the co-founder of the modern sociology of intellectuals, echoed Michels' conclusion about the heterogeneous political commitments of intellectuals, arguing in Ideology and Utopia that they may be found "in all camps," serving as theorists for "conservatives," for the "proletariat" (who "lacked the prerequisites for the acquisition of the knowledge necessary for modern political conflict"), and for the "liberal bourgeoisie" (Mannheim, 1949: 141). Mannheim's most systematic attempt to explain the diverse political orientations of intellectuals is contained, however, not in Ideology and Utopia, but in a pathbreaking essay, "The Problem of the Intelligentsia." In it he argues, against classical Marxist interpretations, that class position was only one determinant (albeit an important one) of political ideology, with such factors as social background, ethnicity, religion, sex, age, education, mobility, and patterns of association and institutional affiliation also playing important roles (Mannheim, 1971: 91-170). The present analysis differs, however, from Mannheim in its skepticism about his concept of relatively "detached intellectuals" and its rejection of his belief that the intelligentsia is under all circumstances "incapable of concerted action" (Mannheim, 1971: 104).

[10] Bauman (1992: 81).

[11] Bauman (1987: 8).

[12] Bauman (1992: 85).

[13] Explaining his refusal to participate in the recurrent controversy about who is and is not an "intellectual," Bauman describes the debate as "either an element of power rhetoric developed by some sectors of the category to serve the 'closure' struggles, or the result of outsiders confusing power rhetoric with sociological analysis" (Bauman, 1987: 18-19). Bauman's debt to Foucault here, as elsewhere, is obvious;

for Foucault's own most explicit attempt to deal with the problem of intellectuals, see Power/Knowledge (1980). On the question of the stakes that various groups have in different schemas of social classification, see Bourdieu (1985).

[14] Said (1994: 11).

[15] Hofstadter (1970: 27).

[16] The phrase is borrowed from the title of Edward Shils' influential 1958 essay, "The Intellectuals and the Powers," reprinted in a useful volume that brings together many of his essays, written from a comparative and historical perspective, on intellectuals (Shils, 1972).

[17] Lipset (1963: 333).

[18] Lipset and Dobson (1972: 138); Coser (1970; viii).

[19] We will take up the issue of the differences between "intellectuals" and "intelligentsia," especially as these terms pertain to both Eastern Europe and Communist regimes later in the paper. In the case of the United States, Lipset argues that the "intelligentsia" refers to only the first two groups (i.e. the producers and distributors, but not the appliers of culture, whereas in Europe it commonly refers to all three (Lipset, 1963: 333). More recently, however, a number of analysts -- among them, Alvin Gouldner (1975-1976; 1979; 1985) -- have used the term "intelligentsia" to refer to all three groups. In keeping with this usage, this paper will refer to all three groups when using the term "intelligentsia," especially as it applies to the United States and Western Europe.

[20] Bauman (1987: 19).

[21] Verdery (1991: 16-17).

[22] On the distinction between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" domination, see Max Weber (1978).

[23] Mann (1993: 1-2, 136-739).

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[65] Schapiro (1966); Daniels (1960); Siegelbaum (1992); Fitzpatrick (1994).

[66] As early as 1930, William Henry Chamberlain, author of the classic two-volume study, The Russian Revolution, 1971-1921, was writing about "The Tragedy of the Russian Intelligentsia" (1930: 339-351). Apart from the Bolshevik Revolution itself and the ensuing civil war, two other decisive blows were delivered to the classical Russian intelligentsia, both Marxist and non-Marxist: the "Cultural Revolution" of 1928-1931 and the "Great Purge" of 1936-1938. On the Cultural Revolution, see Fitzpatrick (1984); on the

Great Purge, see Medvedev (1989); for a work spanning both events, see the second volume of Tucker's biography of Stalin (1992).

[67] The attempt in the following pages to theorize about the place of intellectuals in Communist regimes is based in part on the results of four case studies on intellectuals in Russian and Eastern Europe: the construction of a "new socialist intelligentsia" in the Soviet Union between 1917 and 1939, the Prague Spring of 1968, the Solidarity movement of 1980-1981, and the reform movement in the Soviet Union from 1985 to 1991. These four cases are part of a larger book manuscript tentatively titled The Vanquished Vanguard: Intellectuals in the Making and Unmaking of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe.

[68] Gerth and Mills (1946: 240-245).

[69] See Michnik (1977) and Kuron and Modzelewski (1966; 1967).

[70] For an analysis of the role of "political" intellectuals in the Polish Solidarity movement and the Prague Spring, see Karabel (1993; 1995).

[71] On Lenin's ideas about science and technology, see Claudin-Urondo (1977); for historical studies of his actual treatment of scientists and engineers, see Bailes (1978) and Lampert (1979).

[72] Garrard and Garrard (1990).

[73] Matthews (1978).

[74] Voslensky (1984); Matthews (1978).

[75] The magnetic force of Marxist ideology to idealistic members of the intelligentsia is a recurring theme in the memoirs and autobiographies of Communists and former Communists. For the Russian case, three of the richest of these memoirs are Serge (1984), Kopelev (1980), Ginzburg (1967).

[76] Conquest (1991); Getty and Manning (1993); Medvedev (1989); Tucker (1977); Gouldner (1977-1978).

[77] Brym (1980: 29-31).

[78] Mann (1993).

[79] Sakharov (1990; 1991); Lizhi (1992).

[80] For a theoretically elegant expression of this viewpoint, see Parkin (1972).

[81] Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power was finished in manuscript form in September 1974 and was confiscated by the Hungarian police a few days later. Its authors spent a week in jail; as they noted in the

preface to the English edition, "twenty years earlier we could have been executed for the same piece of work" (Konrad and Szelenyi, 1979: xviii). Szelenyi left Hungary for London in May 1975 and migrated to Australia in 1976; Konrad remained in Budapest, where he continued to write novels -- a particularly revealing example of how much some of the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe had changed since the Stalin years.

[82] Szelenyi (1986-1987). For a critique of the "new class" thesis as put foreward by Konrad and Szelenyi, see Frentzel-Zagorska and Zagorska (1989).

[83] Solzhenitsyn's most political work is, of course, <u>The Gulag Archipelago</u>, but some of his works of fiction -- notably, <u>One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich</u>, <u>The First Circle</u>, and <u>The Cancer Ward</u> (all written while he was still in Russia) -- seriously undermined the official ideology of the regime. Havel first came to prominence as a playright -- the satirical plays <u>The Garden Party</u> and <u>The Memorandum</u> were both written in the 1960s, before he was 30 -- but his greatest political impact as a writer came from his <u>samizdat</u> essays, most notably <u>The Power of the Powerless</u>, and his book of autobiographical interviews, <u>Disturbing the Peace</u>.

[84] Kaplan (1973); Gella (1991).

[85] Havel (1985).

[86] Lipski (1985).

[87] Laba (1991); Goodwyn (1991); Karabel (1993).

[88] Weber (1978).

[89] Bauman (1992: 93).