Autonomy Versus Authoritarianism

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IN 1989 China suffered through the bloodiest clash yet between the contradictory tendencies that have characterized the entire history of the Communist Party's relation with Chinese society: a drive toward autonomy and the effort to assert authority. Deng Xiaoping's reforms explicitly called for decentralization, enterprise autonomy, privatization, creativity, and individual initiative to stimulate economic development. But Deng also insisted that the Party must maintain total political and social dominance.

Chinese people see their nation's history since 1949 as an oscillation between two extremes of tightening (*shou*) and loosening (*fang*) of control over the economy, polity, and society by the Chinese Communist Party. By their nature, communist parties attempt to monopolize control over the societies they rule, and in China, this impetus was reinforced by a tradition of authoritarianism. Nonetheless, the Chinese Party never achieved total control, and on several occasions loosened its grip in order to address crises. The decade of reform beginning in 1979 was the longest sustained period of liberalization (*fang*) since the CCP took power in 1949, although it was punctuated by attempts to roll back. This chapter shows how 1989 embodies the legacy of these contradictory trends in the context both of Marxism-Leninism and of Chinese tradition.

Leninism and totalitarianism

A Leninist political party cannot tolerate autonomous action by social and political groups. Lenin created a type of political party which Philip Selznick called an 'organizational weapon.'[1] Based on the principle of 'democratic centralism,' Party members must submit to iron discipline and never question Party policy. The Party itself is a vanguard Party, in theory comprising only advanced members of society possessed of the highest consciousness of the laws of social development and totally committed to the lofty task of leading their society. This involves first the seizure of state

power, then, for Leninist parties which adopt Marxism as their guiding ideology, as most do, building socialism.

In the Marxist-Leninist self-image, because Party members constantly study Marxism, they understand the direction of social development and where the long-term interests of the masses lie. The masses themselves, primarily workers and peasants, lack this comprehension; it is up to the vanguard to educate them about their long-term interests and to make policies that help achieve them. Consequently, after seizing state power, Party members must monopolize leadership of all organizations of the state, economy, and society (including the superstructure of education and the arts) using them as instruments to lead society toward the bright socialist future. Social groups cannot enjoy autonomy in organization, membership, leadership, or definition and pursuit of goals, because their backward, unenlightened practices and values risk obstructing or derailing society's progress. In China, the Communist Party attained a high level of control not only of institutions but also over the daily lives of Chinese citizens. This can be attributed to two factors. One is the Party's truly miraculous success at overthrowing Chiang Kai-shek's American-backed Nationalist Party, eliminating the old elite, then stabilizing, rehabilitating, and building the economy. China's communist movement was indigenous, unlike most Eastern European communist regimes, which were imposed and backed by the USSR.

The other reason for the success of the CCP in quickly gaining ascendancy over Chinese society is Leninism's affinity with central elements of the Chinese political tradition.[2] These include: 1) the rule of ideologically indoctrinated superior men rather than laws; 2) absence of a sense of tension between the individual and the state; 3) absence of intermediary institutions between state and society; 4) acceptance of an orthodox, 'correct' view of the world with bureaucrats as its moral exemplars exercising power linked to ethical ideals; 5) intolerance of heterodoxy and political power outside the formal governmental structure: 6) desire for order and fear of chaos; 7) legitimate hierarchy of personal relations with deference to and dependence on authority from the family up to the emperor; 8) perfectibility through study and self-cultivation.

I do not wish to draw too simplistic a line between Chinese tradition and Leninism, nor claim that Chinese are better suited to authoritarianism than to democracy. However, there is no question that the CCP was able to build upon elements of longstanding

legitimacy in Chinese society, and prevent the emergence of autonomous organizations until the end of the 1980s.

Although the CCP established a structure for totalitarian dominance, it never achieved total control, if indeed such a thing is even possible. Instead, control has flowed between extremes of restriction (*shou*) and liberalization (*fang*). Why has this movement between *shou* and *fang* occurred?

First, leaders manipulate the political environment as a tool in their power struggles. For instance, in 1978, Deng Xiaoping applauded the use of big character posters and free expression of grievances critical of the Cultural Revolution as a veiled way of discrediting the still-Maoist regime headed by his rival Hua Guofeng. Once it was clear that Hua and his cronies would have to yield power, Deng cracked down on the Democracy Wall movement. He turned *shou* and *fang* on and off like tap water.

Second, cadres can obstruct the implementation of policies because they oppose a particular policy, or fear that if they zealously implement it, when the line (inevitably) changes, they will be vulnerable to criticism. Hence, it is better to do nothing. Because most Party members work in social units and not the Party bureaucracy, they often adopt the viewpoint of their unit, and obstruct the implementation of policies that will harm these interests.

A third reason causing the shift between restriction and liberalization comes from the failure or success of previous policies. For instance, direct Party leadership over the state and society reached its zenith during the Cultural Revolution and brought disaster upon the Chinese people. Under Deng, the reformers realized they had to loosen up if the Party and nation were to survive. Social and intellectual consequences of the liberalizing economic reforms, in turn, led other leaders to try to reimpose control.

Another related cause of the oscillation is the conflict between trying to achieve both economic development and utopian communist goals.[3] Economic growth requires a certain amount of freedom that engenders social changes that 'run counter to the utopian vision,' thereby necessitating 'repeated "revolutions from above",'[4] that is, renewed Party dominance to bring social developments back under its control.

Finally, the international environment can cause a movement between *shou* and *fang*. As an example, in the early 1970s, when

the Chinese perceived that the U.S. no longer posed a direct threat to their security, they relaxed relations.

Tightening-loosening can take many forms. There might be economic liberalization with political restriction. There might be a clampdown in Beijing and liberalization in the provinces. Some social groups might experience restrictions while others escape untouched.

Liberalization does not mean autonomy. It means, adapting Chen Yun's famous simile referring to the economy, a roomier birdcage for people to fly around in; it does not mean no cage at all.[5] Party cadres grant people more scope to manage their affairs but do not grant them so much freedom that they might subvert Party control. It was when too many Chinese began to cross the line to true autonomy from the Party during 1988–89 that some members of the leadership realized they had to act decisively.

Eliminating the bases of autonomy

To better appreciate the trend toward autonomy after 1978, we must first look at how the CCP tried to eliminate the bases for such autonomous activity soon after taking national power.

There were only 4.5 million CCP members in a total population of 541 million when the Party established the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949. A large percentage of Party members were peasants with at best only rudimentary education and little or no experience of a modern economy or urban life. Out of necessity, the CCP retained many bureaucrats from the former regime, but began to remove them as more trustworthy replacements could be found. The Party quickly began to establish its control over state and society, progressively eliminating enemies and potential competitors. It used terror and violence against counter-revolutionaries, some remnants of the old regime, landlords, and other 'disruptive' elements. It established a pervasive system of police and informers. It channeled citizens into mass organizations under Party control to monitor their activities and indoctrinate them in the new values and norms.

The Party began to restrict and remold intellectuals in the Ideological Reform Campaign in late 1951. Party cadres took over the entire educational system as well as the media and other cultural organizations. The activities of religious associations were

monitored and, in the case of Christianity and Catholicism, the CCP forced them to sever their foreign links.

Through confiscation of the modern economic sector, the new regime inherited a large bloc of China's industrial workers and recruited them into Party-led unions. National capitalists and petit bourgeois businessmen became totally dependent on the state for utilities, capital, raw materials, and foodstuffs. By means of the Five-Anti Campaign[6] of 1952, the Party served notice on the private sector that its sphere of activity would be increasingly circumscribed. Bureaucratic job allocation replaced the labor market.

In the countryside, land reform eliminated the landlord class. Redistribution of land and property, followed by collectivization, brought peasants under Party leadership, and their output under state control. Stringent restriction on migration to the cities tied peasants to the land. Introducing Party-state control into old institutions and creating many new ones established an environment designed to reorient political, economic, social, and cultural activity in a new direction. At the same time, the CCP endeavored to remold all Chinese citizens as individuals. This involved ensuring that much of their waking life was spent in CCP-led organizations. Large state units (*danwei*) provided housing, schooling, health care, recreation, and rationed goods in addition to a job. People also had to participate in small groups at work or home where Party members or lay activists led them in studying official documents, monitored their thoughts and behavior, and pushed them to engage in criticism and self-criticism. The Party tried to revolutionize interpersonal relations as well, replacing former particularistic ties of friendship and family with universalistic ties of comradeship tied to the national mission of building socialism. Political messages dominated popular culture and the media. Restricted access to cultural artifacts and information from outside the communist bloc reoriented China's intellectual world.

Certainly, some measure of a private life continued, but it had to operate circumspectly. Particularly in the urban areas, people learned to ritualize public behavior, keeping their thoughts to themselves and a few trusted intimates.

Ironically, while the Cultural Revolution trumpeted that 'the Party must lead everything,' it simultaneously wreaked havoc on the Party as an organization. Constant power struggles, inconsistent policies, arbitrary exercise of power, and a wide gap between official values of asceticism and discipline and the reality of indulgence and corruption, left the Party with weak organization, low morale, and even lower prestige. The economy was stagnating and the standard of living declining.

In Deng Xiaoping's analysis, the Party's ability to retain power required a tactical retrenchment, ceding to the people more power over their own lives. The CCP had to win back the prestige it had lost by improving people's standard of living, introducing more predictability and stability into their lives, and restraining the arbitrary power of unpopular bureaucrats.[7]

The major thrust of this liberalization came in the economic realm, where Chinese were permitted and compelled to assume personal responsibility for their economic lot. Rapid decollectivization in the countryside brought about a return of family farming (without private land ownership) and a clear linkage between effort and reward through the market. Farmers were encouraged to diversify their economic activity; they could even leave agriculture altogether.

Economic liberalization in the urban areas came more slowly, but followed the same trends of Party retrenchment and increased autonomy. Control devolved from Beijing to localities and enterprises. The market began to replace the plan and prices for many goods were freed. In a revolutionary departure from orthodox Stalinism, the Chinese leaders began to encourage the consumer goods sector. To respond successfully to consumer demands required autonomy from rigid state plans. Enterprise directors had to be entrepreneurial and competent; this meant that they and not Party secretaries had to have decision-making power. These are all examples of the reformers' recognition of the need for *fang* in order to enliven the domestic economy.

Another example of Party-induced liberalization was the official encouragement of urban small-scale private business, in particular in the service sector. The CCP did this to solve a severe unemployment problem and also to stimulate production, enliven the market, and fill gaps in the economy. China's leaders anticipated that private businessmen would have to rely on the state for materials and capital, but wily entrepreneurs quickly established their own networks. What is more, they had permission to travel nationwide to purchase materials. Private businessmen were thus

liberated to a large degree from the stifling womblike work-cum-residential units which most other urban Chinese are compelled to depend on.

The thousands of Chinese who found jobs in foreign-invested companies also enjoyed unprecedented autonomy from Party control. Those with access to telephone, telex, fax, and foreign travel suddenly gained direct contact with a world of information previously restricted to only the highest officials. Investors, tourists, experts, and students from abroad also revolutionized the world of Chinese they came into contact with. The fact that many of these visitors were ethnic Chinese from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia opened the eyes of mainlanders to the momentous changes that had occurred in Chinese societies outside the socialist motherland, and suggested the potential benefits to themselves and the nation of a different type of system.

Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang's speech at the Thirteenth National CCP Congress in October 1987, put forth the slogan, 'the primary stage of socialism.'[8] This gave an official blessing to a mixed economic system (under a dominant state sector) with a degree of tolerance for inequality and social diversity. Zhao claimed that China already was socialist, but because it had yet to achieve an advanced level of productive forces, had to permit a diverse range of economic activity in order to overcome the disadvantages of backwardness. Zhao's speech clearly downplayed politics. A legitimate second channel for upward mobility in China, outside the Party track, had emerged, based on individual initiative and effort. In other words, the CCP officially sanctioned autonomy in the economic realm.

Social scientists began to recognize that economic diversity was having an effect on social structure and values as well. Writers discussed the way that social values had changed as a result of reforms. Absolutism had given way to relativity, centralization to pluralism, theory to practice, and so on. People were no longer ascetics and the individual had emerged against the collective, some asserted.[9] A wave of opinion polling similarly turned up increased diversity of views on a range of subjects as a result of reforms.[10]

Intellectuals increasingly met on their own. George Soros, the Hungarian-American financier who had established the Soros Fund to support independent intellectual inquiry in Hungary, set up the China Fund for the same purpose in 1986 with Zhao Ziyang's blessing. The new pluralism was reflected as well in the

arts. Drama, cinema, fiction, poetry, painting, sculpture, and so on entered a number of 'forbidden zones' to discuss formerly taboo subjects utilizing forms of artistic expression unknown in China. These included pure Western imports such as stream-of-consciousness, but also efforts to transform traditional Chinese forms.[11] China's Fifth Generation filmmakers attracted international attention.

Privatization of activity had a counterpart in privatization of values. Increasingly, Chinese opted out of Party-led political activity, concentrating their energies on making money, consuming, personal adornment, and the joys of family life. With the bankruptcy of official ideology, many searched for new sources of spiritual values. Religion experienced an unprecedented surge. Christian and Catholic churches enjoyed record attendance. In the countryside, Buddhism and a range of folk religions (branded 'superstition' by the authorities) also re-emerged.

In sum, the Party-initiated reforms had unintentionally created many potential social bases for autonomy: some state and collective enterprises, private business, foreign enterprises, cultural institutions, and ties with foreigners. China had no non-Party institutions with mass legitimacy, but the Party-state's retrenchment created an opening for many social groups to begin managing their own affairs. Scholars affiliated with the regime provided theoretical legitimacy for this trend.[12] It appeared that the supporters of economic liberalization were willing to tolerate attendant social and intellectual liberalization, and that they could prevent opponents from sabotaging this trend.

In fact, these trends had provoked fear and loathing among some elements of the Chinese leadership. They sensed that the CCP had lost control over major spheres of Chinese economic, cultural, and social life and appeared to be losing its grip on political life as well. As David Kelly notes elsewhere in this volume, the Party was becoming irrelevant to increasing numbers of Chinese.

To counter this tide, in 1981 conservatives attacked PLA writer Bai Hua's screenplay, *Unrequited Love*, whose central question, 'You love the motherland, but does the motherland love you?' voiced the frustration of many patriotic intellectuals. In the fall of 1983, conservative stalwarts such as Deng Liqun and Hu Qiaomu went after 'spiritual pollution,' initially defined as pornography, but then broadened to cover almost anything a particular official

disliked,[13] including rural specialized households, urban private entrepreneurs, youthful criminals (thousands of whom were executed), and cultural figures.

University students in Hefei and Shanghai took to the streets late in 1986 demanding democracy and changes in the educational system. The vice president of the Hefei-based Chinese University of Science and Technology, Fang Lizhi, galvanized the students with a number of stirring pro-democracy speeches. In response, conservative leaders, including Deng Xiaoping, launched an attack against 'bourgeois liberalization,' which resulted in the sacking of Hu Yaobang from his post as CCP General Secretary, and the expulsion of Fang, Liu Binyan, and Wang Ruowang from the Party.[14] The students were rather handily suppressed with minimal violence.

The campaigns of 1983–84 and 1986–87 both fizzled out. Their conservative proponents suffered a humiliating loss of face and power as the Chinese masses and foreign opinion mocked their retrograde efforts. It also appeared that the increased involvement of foreign businesses, banks, and experts in China had helped to brake these Mao-style campaigns. The logical conclusion appeared to be that the moderate leaders had emerged victorious and that they were prepared to tolerate a great deal of diversity, even a bit of anarchy, in their headlong effort to modernize the economy.

In the winter of 1988–89, a curious debate signaled renewed fighting in Zhongnanhai. At conferences and in the press, scholars discussed the issue of 'neo-authoritarianism.'[15] Proponents of neo-authoritarianism argued that China needed a strong leader to push the reforms forward against continued unnamed resistance. The models of Japan and the Four Dragons (Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong) were cited as examples of successful economic development with strong authority. Once the situation stabilized, the argument ran, then the market economy would expand and political democracy could evolve based on newly emergent social forces. Opponents countered that democracy was not anarchic and that authoritarianism would shut off outlets for political expression, resulting in still greater instability.

Some observers realized that proponents of neo-authoritarianism were using this theory to shore up Zhao Ziyang's weakening position against attacks by Li Peng and other conservatives, especially aged retired revolutionaries, who wished to reimpose more controls over the economy and society.[16] Neo-authoritarians hoped to pre-empt Li and company by further institutionalizing the economic reforms while making temporary sacrifices on the sociopolitical front, although the theory could just as easily support the conservatives.[17]

Autonomy versus authority

The events of April and May 1989 strengthened the hands of Zhao's opponents. Not only did social chaos increase, but autonomous organizations began to appear. Many of these grew out of more or less formal discussion groups which students and others had attended.[18]

Significantly, virtually all of these groups included the word 'autonomous' (*zizhi*) in their name to stress that they were part of neither the state or Party. Most noticeable was the Beijing University Federation, comprising representatives of autonomous organizations established on many campuses. One of its heads was Beijing University history student Wang Dan, who had sponsored Wednesday afternoon democratic salons for more than a year with the backing of Fang Lizhi and Fang's wife, Li Shuxian.[19] Liu Xiaobo, the literary critic, worked with the Federation and also prepared to establish a Beijing Federation of All Circles, according to accusations against him.[20]

Autonomous student organizations were not limited to Beijing. Glancing through the *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* in the days after June 4, one sees, for instance, that students in Hefei (site of the 1986 demonstrations), Changchun, Chengdu, Shanghai, Liaoning, Xian, and Changsha organized similar associations. In addition to these new associations, students, as well as workers, journalists, and others, in some cases joined by their Party leaders, marched in protests carrying banners of their particular units.

Workers around China also formed autonomous associations with similar goals of engaging the leadership in dialogue over ways to solve problems such as inflation, corruption, inequality, and the stifling Party monopoly of power. In Hefei, the Hefei Municipal Self-Government Association of Workers, the Hefei Municipal Union of Workers, and the Hefei Municipal Association of Initiative-Taking Workers, paraded, distributed handbills, called for strikes by workers and students, and 'attempted to alienate the relations between trade unions and the Party and the government, divide the working class, and undermine the normal order in

Hefei.'[21] Members of Beijing's Workers Autonomous Federation stood accused of particularly aggressive violence.[22]

In many cities, citizens groups emerged in support of students and workers. According to Xinhua, the 'Beijing Citizens Hunger Strike Corps and Dare-To-Die Corps,' comprising mainly 'vagrants and idlers in society...were under the direct control and command of the "Beijing College Students Autonomous Federation," which funded them and supplied them with Molotov cocktails. They helped to erect the Goddess of Democracy as well.'[23] Private entrepreneurs in Beijing were actively involved in the Flying Tigers Team, using their motorcycles to run messages and supply goods.

Police in Tengzhou City, Shandong, reported the arrest of an activist of the Beijing Peasants Autonomous Union. He was accused of a variety of counterrevolutionary crimes in Beijing as well as several locations in Shandong.[24] The extent of peasant involvement in the movement is unclear.

Intellectuals also organized autonomous associations. Yan Jiaqi and Bao Zunxin of the Institute of Politics and the Institute of History of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences headed the Beijing Association of Intellectuals. Another prominent organization, which predated the demonstrations, was the Social Development Research Institute of the private Stone Company headquartered in Beijing's 'Silicon Valley.' The company enjoyed the backing of reformers in the leadership. Hu Jiwei, former editor of the *People's Daily* who was sacked during the anti-spiritual pollution campaign, used Stone's think tank on two occasions to collect signatures of NPC members and others to convene a meeting to discuss martial law.[25] Stone's founder, Wan Runnan, provided financial and logistical support to the demonstrators and fled for his life after the crackdown. He emerged in Paris as one of the leaders of the Front for a Democratic China.[26]

Not all participants had the same motives. Certainly, some took advantage of the disorder purely for destructive ends. Many came to watch the action (*kan renao*). But the fact that so many social forces spontaneously organized on their own, giving names to their groups, to vent grievances and press one sort of demand or another, represented a significant change in China's political culture and an unprecedented challenge to the authorities. These were not naive students and workers organizing Red Guard groups to protect Chairman Mao as two decades before, but citizens of all

stripes, tuned into global trends, especially the Soviet Union's *perestroika* and *glasnost*, demanding that the system reform itself in decidedly un-Leninist ways. But the response to it was decidedly Leninist.

At a morning meeting on April 25, Deng Xiaoping responded to reports by Li Peng, Yang Shangkun, and the Beijing Party Committee.[27] Deng called for decisive action, saying, 'We cannot let them have their way.' In his analysis, 'This is not an ordinary student movement, but turmoil.' He did not define what an 'ordinary student movement' is, but we can assume he meant activities initiated and led by the Communist Youth League, official student federations, or similar Party-led organizations in support of officially approved goals.

To Deng, 'Those people who have been influenced by the freedom elements of Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, and the Soviet Union have arisen to create turmoil.' That Mikhail Gorbachev was scheduled to arrive in Beijing three weeks hence made it even more imperative to end the turmoil. Referring again to events in Eastern Europe, Deng added, 'Concessions in Poland led to further concessions. The more they conceded, the more chaos.' Deng's remarks revealed frustration that the Party missed the chance to take early decisive action to nip this movement in the bud, tracing this failure back to Hu Yaobang's halfhearted efforts to stamp out bourgeois liberalization in 1986.

Furthermore, the students were using 'the rights of democracy and freedom in the Constitution to impose restrictions on us.' That is to say, the students demanded that the state implement its own Constitution. But Deng wanted to use the extralegal Four Cardinal Principles[28] to deal with the turmoil. He stated that 'This turmoil is entirely a planned conspiracy to transform a China with a bright future into a China without hope.'

Deng's Leninist view ultimately prevailed, with the quest for autonomy labeled a 'counterrevolutionary rebellion.'

Unresolved contradictions

June 4 signaled the reassertion of *shou*, but it leaves a schizophrenic, ultimately unstable mix. While calling for 'unity and stability,' the primacy of the Four Cardinal Principles, recentralization, and strengthened CCP leadership, the post-June 4 leadership also

claims it has not abandoned economic reforms, the open door, or enlivening the domestic economy.

After purging universities and think tanks, the leadership has tightened control of students, intellectuals, and workers to prevent the resurgence of autonomous organizations. Cultural life has become a combination of mind-numbing political propaganda and inane bread-and-circus. Workers are organized to view museum exhibits on 'Pacifying the Counterrevolutionary Rebellion.'

The state is recentralizing economic control in Beijing, strengthening the role of Party secretaries in enterprises at the expense of directors, and closely regulating private business. It has made noises about solving some of the concerns voiced by the masses last spring,[29] but to date, only low- and medium-rank officials or allies of Zhao Ziyang have been punished for corruption. It has cooled the politically sensitive inflation rate but at the cost of shutting down thousands of state, collective, and private enterprises. It emphasizes that China's 'democratic parties' serve to advise the CCP but not to contest its hegemony. The upshot is a very cynical and pessimistic populace with little confidence in its leadership, which it sees as devoid of idealism, concerned only with preserving its own power and privileges.

Since June 4, the Eastern European dominoes have fallen one after the other, and the Chinese citizenry has been riveted by these events. In the Dengist-Leninist view, these are the inevitable consequences of loosening Party control. The East Germans and Czechs did try the 'Chinese solution,' beating and firing on demonstrators, acts which only motivated more demonstrations and the ultimate collapse of a once-hard-line regime. These countries, like Poland, had a legacy of civil society and nascent political parties, and their communist parties had never enjoyed popular legitimacy. As noted earlier, the Chinese Party had once enjoyed such popular support, but its subsequent actions have eroded this probably beyond repair.

The Christmas overthrow of China's close comrade-in-arms, Romania's Nicolae Ceausescu, who had gone the Chinese one better by shooting civilians from helicopters, even more clearly demonstrated the bankruptcy of the Chinese solution. China's decade of opening to the outside went much further than Romania's, a fact not lost on the inhabitants of Zhongnanhai. Their response has been even more *shou*, and warmer relations with the anti-reform regimes in Burma and Cuba.

The startling events of 1989 throughout the socialist world raise the question of whether Marxist-Leninist systems can be reformed without being dismantled. Once they permit autonomy they are compromised. Facts demonstrate that *fang* in one sphere inevitably expands to others. Marxism teaches that all social systems prior to communism are riddled with contradictions, and Mao taught that this includes socialism. China's tenacious gerontocratic Leninist leaders demonstrated their unwillingness to tolerate what they now vilify as 'peaceful evolution.' But the Party itself is seriously split, and the major question is the position of the successors. Some, such as Li Peng, who is a surrogate for the elders, would try to maintain power through suppression of pluralistic tendencies. This will only generate increased tensions and more violence. Should the chastised pro-reform neo-authoritarians regain power, there is a better chance of leaders recognizing the inevitability of change. Since their economic strategy includes a strong role for the market and consumer goods, they must grant competent factory managers decision-making power over their enterprises to satisfy demand. This entails flexibility in finding ways to improve productivity and lower costs, often through technological changes. These naturally have social consequences, and the question is whether the neo-authoritarians would be more willing and able to devise a strategy to guide social change and build a new consensus within society, and between the Party and society in order to avoid yet another outbreak of bloodshed on Tiananmen Square.

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1. Philip Selznick, *The Organizational Weapon* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960).
2. Some of the following elements are discussed in Lucian W. Pye, *Asian Power and Politics* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), especially Chapter 3; and Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, second edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).
3. Richard Lowenthal, 'Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy,' in Chalmers Johnson, ed., *Change in Communist Systems* (Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 33–116.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
5. David M. Bachman, *Chen Yun and the Chinese Political System* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, Center for Chinese Studies, 1985).
6. The campaign was to eliminate the five vices of bribery, tax eva-

sion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and stealing state economic information.

7. Deng Xiaoping, 'On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership,' Deng Xiaoping, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1975–1982* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), pp. 302–25.

8. Zhao Ziyang, 'Advance Along the Road of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,' *Beijing Review* (North American Edition), (BR) 45, 9–15 November 1987, pp. 23–49.

9. Liu Yuejin, 'Shinian Gaigezhong Jiazhiguan di Shige Zhuanbian' (Ten Changes in Values in the Course of a Decade of Reforms), *Xinhua Wenzhai*, 1989, pp. 13–16.

10. Stanley Rosen, 'Public Opinion and Reform in the People's Republic of China,' *Studies in Comparative Communism*, XXII(2–3), Summer/Autumn, 1989, pp. 153–70.

11. A first-rate sampling can be found in Geremie Barme and John Minford, ed., *Seeds of Fire* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1988).

12. In the Eastern European context, this has been called the emergence of civil society. Some essays on this subject can be found in Part 3 of John Keane, ed., *Civil Society and the State* (London: Verso, 1988).

13. Thomas B. Gold, '"Just in Time!" China Battles Spiritual Pollution on the Eve of 1984,' *Asian Survey* XXIV(9), September, 1984, pp. 947–74.

14. Orville Schell, *Discos and Democracy* (New York: Pantheon, 1988).

15. Xiao Gonggin, 'Checks and Balances by Authority: The Only Way to Success in China's Reform,' *Shijie Jinghi paobao* (World Economic Herald), 13 March 1989, p. 11. In *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (FBIS), 24 March 1989, pp. 40–3.

16. For example, James L. Tyson and Ann Scott Tyson, 'Calls for a New Despotism in China,' *Christian Science Monitor*, 22 February 1989, pp. 1–2.

17. Thomas B. Gold, 'Neo-Authoritarianism Won't Create Economic Miracle,' *Los Angeles Times*, 30 June 1989, p. 119.

18. Craig Calhoun, 'The Beijing Spring, 1989: Notes on the Making of a Protest,' *Dissent*, Fall, 1989. Also, see essays by Jane Macartney, David Kelly, and Geremie Barmé in this volume.

19. 'Who Stirred Up the Turmoil,' *Beijing Review*, 10–16 July 1989, pp. 25–6.

20. 'Seize the Vicious Manipulator — Liu Xiaobo,' *ibid*, pp. 26–9.

21. 'Union Council Issues Statement,' FBIS, 13 June 1989, p. 39.

22. 'Security Organs Arrest Beijing Workers' Leaders', Xinhua, in FBIS, 16 June 1989, p. 50.

23. 'Sixteen Members of "Capital Workers Special Picket Corps" Arrested and Charged,' FBIS, 19 June 1989, p. 28.

24. 'Shandong City Arrests "Counterrevolutinary,"' FBIS, 20 June 1989, p. 41.

25. 'Signature Incident Discussed,' Xinhua, in FBIS, 5 July 1989, pp. 27–8.

26. Ye Guang, 'Wan Runnan Bangi "Shitou" Yao Za Shei?' 'Who Did Wan Runnan Want to Smash By Throwing "Stones?"' *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily), domestic, 17 August 1989, p. 1.

27. I have used the text as printed in *South China Morning Post*, 31 May 1989, p. 12.

28. Leadership of the CCP; the socialist road; dominant place of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung thought; and dictatorship of the proletariat (softened as 'people's democratic dictatorship').

29. '*Jinqi Zuo Qijian Qunzhong Guanxin di Shi*' (In the near future, do 7 things the masses are concerned about), *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily), 29 July 1989, p. 1. These include cleaning up companies associated with cadres and the business activities of their family members and a raft of other privileges.